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Insights from a Neo-Institutional Framework 
 
Abstract 
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance (CG) 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR), and consequently, examines whether CG can positively 
moderate the association between corporate financial performance (CFP) and CSR. 
Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of large listed corporations from 2002 to 2009, we find that, 
on average, better-governed corporations tend to pursue a more socially responsible agenda through 
increased CSR practices. We also find that a combination of CSR and CG practices has a stronger positive 
effect on CFP than CSR alone, implying that CG positively influences the CFP-CSR relationship. Our 
results are robust to controlling for different types of endogeneities, as well as alternative CFP, CG and 
CSR proxies. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The paper generally contributes to the literature on CG, CSR and 
CFP. Specifically, we make two main new contributions to the extant literature by drawing on new 
insights from an overarching neo-institutional framework. First, we show why and how better-governed 
corporations are more likely to pursue a more socially responsible agenda. Second, we provide evidence 
on why and how CG might strengthen the link between CFP and CSR. 
Practical/Policy Implications: Our findings have important implications for corporate regulators and 
policy-makers. Since our evidence suggests that better-governed corporations are more likely to be more 
socially responsible with a consequential positive effect on CFP, it provides corporate regulators, 
managers and policy-makers with a new impetus to develop a more explicit agenda of jointly pursuing CG 
and CSR reforms, instead of merely considering CSR as a peripheral component of CG or as an 
independent corporate activity.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Financial 
Performance, Neo-Institutional Theory  
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INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). As such, it is at the intersection of two topical and closely-related research strands, 
namely: (i) the effects of CG on corporate financial performance (CFP) (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; 
Henry, 2008; Bozec & Bozec, 2012); and (ii) the determinants/consequences of a company’s CSR 
practices (McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988; Fifka, 2013). However, studies investigating the link 
between a company’s CG and its CSR strategy (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012) 
and/or how a company’s CG might potentially influence the CFP-CSR nexus (Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; 
Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012a) are very rare. This study, therefore, investigates why and how a 
company’s internal CG mechanisms may drive its CSR practices. We also examine why and how the 
CSR and CFP association might be intensified by CG.  
 The past decades have witnessed a significant interest in the extent of CSR practices (Mackenzie, 
2007; Jo & Harjoto, 2012). Whilst a large number of reasons have been offered to explain why 
corporations may engage in CSR activities (Prior, Surroca, & Tribo, 2008; Young & Marais, 2012), 
recent theoretical developments suggest that the substantial growth in CSR activities can also be 
explained by institutional context and theory (Aguilera et al., 2007). In particular, neo-institutional theory 
suggests that institutional forces, such as economic, political and social institutions can interact to shape, 
limit and/or facilitate the diffusion and/or imposition of business practices and innovations in corporations 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 1987, 2001). In general such institutional antecedents have been 
demonstrated to be driven by two main motives: legitimation (moral/relational) and efficiency 
(instrumental) (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Aguilera et al., 2007; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). 
However, whilst neo-institutional theory has been successfully used in explaining the diffusion and/or 
imposition of a number of corporate practices, such as differences in the adoption of international 
accounting and CG standards (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Zattoni & Cuomo, 
2008; Judge et al., 2008, 2010), little is known about institutional antecedents and explanations for the 
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rapid proliferation of CSR practices among corporations. This limits current understanding of the main 
institutional antecedents of the global diffusion of CSR practices at the organisational level.    
 Consequently, the current study seeks to extend and apply an overarching1 neo-institutional 
theory to explain differences in CSR practices at the organisational level - with an emphasis on the 
theoretical implications of legitimation and efficiency. From a legitimation/moral perspective (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995), neo-institutional theory suggests that regulative institutional pressures can 
compel economic units to conform to expected social behaviour and international standards. This is 
because conforming to such expected social behaviour can enhance legitimacy and social acceptance. 
Thus, compliance with good CSR practices in the form of increased CSR disclosures can facilitate 
congruence of corporate goals and norms with those of the larger society, and thereby improving 
organisational legitimacy. Similarly, the need to maintain good relationships with various corporate 
stakeholders (Aguilera et al., 2007), and therefore improving corporate legitimacy can influence 
economic actors to engage in or mimic accepted social behaviour (Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Hence, 
corporate engagement in CSR activities can strategically enhance organisational legitimacy by winning 
the support of powerful corporate stakeholders, such as governments, politicians, shareholders and trade 
unions (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984).  
 In parallel, the efficiency/instrumental view of neo-institutional theory predicts that regulative, 
cognitive and normative institutional pressures can also compel economic entities to compete for critical 
resources in order to protect shareholder interests and maximise corporate performance (Aguilera et al., 
2007; Chen & Roberts, 2010). Thus, corporate investments in socially responsible activities can enhance 
efficiency by reducing economic, social, environmental and political costs, but also can increase access to 
critical resources, such as finance, business contracts, skilled management, and labour (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006). Furthermore, greater commitment to CSR can improve corporate 
efficiency and maximise CFP by minimising agency conflicts through a reduction in information 
asymmetry between managers and corporate stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rhodes & 
Soobaroyen, 2010). Therefore, in consideration of the apparent multi-faceted nature and consequences of 
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CSR and CG practices (Parker, 2005; Devinney, 2009), there is an increasing consensus that these 
practices have to be examined from a theoretical perspective, which encompasses both legitimation and 
efficiency motives (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Judge et al., 2008, 2010).  
 Thus, this study makes two main new contributions to the extant literature by examining the links 
among CFP, CG, and CSR. First, by relying on a generalised neo-institutional theory, which emphasises 
the legitimation and efficiency effects of CSR, we seek to investigate the extent to which a firm's internal 
CG structures may influence its CSR practices. Specifically, using an integrated CG index, as well as 
alternative CG mechanisms, we investigate the relationship between CG and CSR mechanisms. Our 
results contribute to the literature by showing that, on average, better-governed corporations are also more 
likely to pursue a more socially responsible agenda. In this case, our organisational-level findings 
complement existing studies that have employed neo-institutional theory to primarily predict institutional 
factors that drive the diffusion of business practices at the country level (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008; Judge et al., 2008, 2010).  
 Second, the considerable numbers of studies that have examined the effect of CSR on CFP report 
conflicting evidence (McGuire et al., 1988; Mahoney & Roberts, 2007; Becchetti & Ciciretti, 2009). 
Whilst this has been attributed primarily to potential methodological weaknesses and endogeneities 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Jo & Harjoto, 2011), recent studies that adequately control for such 
problems still generally report similar mixed results (Scholtens, 2007, 2008; Cai et al., 2012). However, 
given that the decision to engage in CSR activities emanates from corporate boards and top management 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012), we conjecture that CG is likely to have a 
positive effect on the CFP-CSR link. Our results contribute to the extant literature by demonstrating that a 
combination of CSR and CG has a stronger positive effect on CFP compared to the effect of CSR alone. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical 
framework. The following sections discuss the related literature, outline the research context and design, 
and present the empirical analyses, with the concluding remarks containing a summary and a brief 
discussion of policy implications. 
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A NEO-INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CSR PRACTICES 
While the concept of ‘institution’ has been defined in different ways (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; 
Scott, 1987, 2001), it generally refers to accepted socio-economic beliefs, norms and practices associated 
with different aspects of society, such as education, law, politics, religion, and work (Judge et al., 2008, 
2010). Economic institutions focus on determining the motives for members of society (e.g., individuals, 
corporations, and nations) in engaging in economic activities, such as growth maximisation (North, 1990; 
Judge et al., 2008). Such institutions can be formal (e.g., laws and regulations) and/or informal (e.g., 
norms and conventions). Thus, institutional theory from an economic standpoint can be directly linked to 
the concept of ‘economic efficiency’ (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008) or 
‘instrumentality’ (Aguilera et al., 2007) in that it suggests that societal members primarily tend to seek to 
maximise their self-interests by competing for resources. In contrast, sociologists consider institutions as 
being more than just efficient means of producing goods and services, but also as social and cultural 
systems with some symbolic value (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Hence, the sociological approach to 
institutional theory suggests that individuals, groups and corporations not only compete for economic 
resources (‘economic efficiency’), but also seek social approval for the right to exist (‘social legitimacy’) 
(Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). In this respect, legitimation is seen as a relational motive because it 
encompasses a concern for how a firm’s actions are perceived by others (Aguilera et al., 2007). In 
addition, it is argued that this concern is driven by the individual values and ethics of organisational actors, 
which might steer the firm to adopt practices that have no immediate or obvious benefit (i.e., infusing 
organisations with a moral motive). 
 In particular, the neo-institutional theory proposed by Scott (2001) places great emphasis on three 
levels of analysis: societal (global) institutions; governance structures; and actors. Briefly, and at the top 
of Scott’s model are societal and global institutions, which provide a platform, where what is considered 
to be possible, acceptable and legitimate models and menus of social behaviour are officially proposed 
and informally passed (Judge et al., 2008, 2010). These higher level institutions can shape, impede and/or 
spur structures and actions at lower levels. Governance structures occupy the middle level of Scott’s 
 5 
 
 
model, consisting of organisational fields (e.g., corporations that operate in similar industries, as reflected 
in the similarity of goods and services offered) and organisations themselves. As corporations differ in 
complexity, culture, function, and structure, the organisational level of analysis is equally important as it 
has the capacity to affect, and be affected by the organisational fields and the general institutional context. 
At the bottom of Scott’s institutional model are actors, consisting of individuals and groups. Drawing 
from DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983, 1991) ‘coercive/regulative’ (i.e., the presence of institutions that can 
force actors to conform to accepted standards), ‘cognitive/mimetic’ (i.e., the capacity to copy the 
behaviour of other social actors), and ‘normative’ (i.e., expected and accepted social behaviour) concepts 
of institutions, Scott (2001) suggests that these institutional pressures can affect (and are affected by) the 
forces of diffusion and/or imposition of institutional norms and practices, whilst inventing new ways of 
operating and/or negotiating the development of new institutional norms and practices (North, 1990; 
Judge et al., 2010). Therefore, a major underlying assumption within an ‘overarching’ neo-institutional 
perspective is that the actors are not only competing for resources (‘efficiency’), but they are also seeking 
ultimate legitimacy and social acceptance (‘legitimation’). Finally the actors at the three levels interplay 
to create similarities in structure, thought, and action (i.e., ‘institutional isomorphism’) within institutional 
contexts. 
 Neo-institutional theory has been successfully employed in predicting the diffusion and/or 
imposition of a number of corporate practices at the national level, such as the adoption of good CG 
practices (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Yoshikawa et al., 2007; Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008), 
international accounting standards (Judge et al., 2010), and CG legitimacy (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; 
Judge et al., 2008). However, neo-institutional theory has been rarely applied at the organisational level of 
analysis relating to CG/CSR, and this is particularly relevant with respect to the rapid global diffusion 
and/or imposition of CSR practices over the past decades. Arguably, there is scope to extend our 
understanding of the institutional antecedents and explanations for the rapid proliferation of CSR 
practices among corporations (Aguilera et al., 2007). The current study, therefore, seeks to extend and 
apply neo-institutional theory to explain differences in CSR practices at the firm level with particular 
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emphasis on its legitimation and efficiency implications. Our study is also informed by Aguilera et al.’s 
(2007) multilevel theory, which models corporate CSR activities as having both legitimation 
(moral/relational) and efficiency (instrumental) motives.  
 In this respect, a primary resource of all economic organisations is to retain or gain the basic right 
to exist and legitimacy for their operations (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). Suchman (1995) 
indicates that a corporation’s right to exist is legitimised if its value system is in congruence with that of 
the larger social system of which it is part of, but threatened when there is a potential/actual mismatch 
between the two value systems (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 1995). Thus, the capacity of a 
corporation to achieve social acceptance will depend on its ability to demonstrate (i) ‘moral, and/or (ii) 
relational’ responsibility, respectively, towards (i) higher-order values and stewardship interests, and (ii) 
stakeholder interests and societal expectations (Aguilera et al., 2007: 837). Neo-institutional theory 
suggests that a major way of achieving legitimacy is to incorporate accepted institutional norms, rules, 
conventions and practices into corporate operations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 1987, 2001). 
Hence, complying with CSR practices through increased CSR disclosures can enhance corporate 
legitimacy. Similarly, voluntarily engaging in good CSR practices can help corporations to gain moral 
and relational legitimacy by fairly balancing the diverse and often conflicting demands of their various 
powerful stakeholders, such as shareholders, governments, politicians, and employee unions (Freeman & 
Reed, 1983; Freeman, 1984).  
 In addition to seeking legitimacy for their operations, economic organisations, especially Anglo-
American corporations have a major objective of enhancing efficiency in order to maximise CFP 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Devinney, 2009). From an efficiency perspective, neo-institutional 
theory suggests that conformance to ‘regulative/coercive’, ‘cognitive/mimetic’, and ‘normative’ 
institutional forces can be a strategic/instrumental attempt at competing for critical resources, which can 
enhance CFP. In this case, engaging in CSR activities, such as investing in employees and 
environmentally friendly technology can improve CFP by gaining competitive advantages (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Branco & Rodrigues, 2006, 2008). Further, increased commitment to CSR can improve 
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efficiency and enhance CFP by minimising agency costs via a reduction in information asymmetry among 
financial stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rhodes & Soobaroyen, 2010).  
 
CG, CSR, AND CFP LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Prior Studies on the Association between CG and CSR, and Hypotheses Development 
 
Past studies have investigated how CG influences voluntary disclosures (Eng & Mak, 2003; Barako et. al., 
2006; Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Beekes & Brown, 2006) and CFP (Gompers et al., 2003; Renders et al., 
2010; Bozec & Bozec, 2012). Others have examined how general firm-level features, such as size affect 
CSR practices (Adams, 2002; Reverte, 2009; Mahadeo et al., 2011; Fifka, 2013), whilst a limited number 
of studies have explored how ownership and board characteristics influence CSR disclosures (Hillman et 
al., 2001; Lattemann et al., 2009; Judge, 2012). We draw from these strands of the literature to identify 
potential CG variables that might influence CSR disclosures and develop a hypothesis for each of the 
variables. Specifically, we investigate how: (i) the quality of a firm’s internal governance mechanisms, as 
measured by a CG disclosure index; (ii) ownership variables (government ownership, block ownership, 
and institutional ownership); and (iii) board characteristics (board size, independent directors, and board 
diversity) affect CSR practices.  
 
Corporate Governance Disclosure Index. The past decades have witnessed a rapid global diffusion of 
codes of good CG (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).  Whilst most of these codes have focused on good 
practices for the benefits of shareholders, a few emphasise the firm’s responsibility towards a broader 
constituency of stakeholders, including recommendations for good CSR practices (Mallin, 2006, 2007). 
Empirically, a considerable number of studies suggest that good CG enhances CFP (see Bozec & Bozec, 
2012). By contrast, evidence on whether good CG improves CSR practices is rare (Jamali et al., 2008; 
Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). However, and to the extent that good CG is associated with better 
monitoring, it can be expected to positively influence CSR (Starks, 2009; Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011). 
Similarly, from a neo-institutional perspective, complying with good CG rules (i.e., coercive/regulative 
pressures) in the form of increased CSR practices can improve the legitimacy of corporate structures and 
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operations by enhancing corporate reputation (Scott, 1987; Suchman, 1995). Similarly, greater 
commitment to replicate (i.e., cognitive/mimetic pressures) and/or adopt (i.e., normative pressures) good 
CSR practices can improve efficiency and CFP by gaining access to critical resources, such as finance, 
government contracts, skilled employees, and management by winning the support of powerful 
stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
 CG has been broadly theorised as either a pillar/dimension of or complement to CSR (Jamali et 
al., 2008). This suggests that CG is inextricably linked to CSR (Elkington, 2006); with better-governed 
firms more likely to engage in CSR as a credible way of signalling their CG quality (Beekes & Brown, 
2006). Further, the CG-CSR nexus becomes more visible when the broader conception of CG is 
considered, which does not only require honesty, transparency and accountability to shareholders, but also 
responsibility to all stakeholders (Jamali et al., 2008). 
 Although a limited number of studies have empirically examined how ownership and board 
structures influence CSR practices (Aguilera et al., 2006; Barako & Brown, 2008; Dam & Scholtens, 
2012), studies using CG indices are generally scarce. Consistent with past evidence (Gibson & 
O’Donovan, 2007; Jamali et al., 2008; Lattermann et al., 2009), using Gompers et al.’s (2003) CG index 
(GIM), Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) find a positive effect of CG quality on good CSR practices. 
Similarly, using GIM’s index, Harjoto and Jo (2011) report that CG impacts positively on CSR. Further, 
the findings of recent US studies by Jo and Harjoto (2011, 2012) and Cai et al. (2012) support past 
evidence that better-governed corporations tend to engage in CSR practices than their poorly-governed 
counterparts. This suggests that good CG may impact positively on CSR practices and therefore, our first 
hypothesis is that:    
Hypothesis 1:  There is a positive association between internal CG quality, as measured by a  
   CG disclosure index and the extent of CSR practices. 
  
Government Ownership. From a neo-institutional perspective (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991; Scott, 
1987, 2001), governments, as societal institutions, possess the coercive power of the State (e.g., laws and 
enforcement) to regulate the behaviour of lower societal actors, including those at the organisational level. 
Meanwhile codes of good CG and prescriptions for CSR practices (e.g., Global Reporting Initiative) 
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issued around the world have been supported by global institutions, such as the EU, OECD and World 
Bank, with a resultant influence on national governments (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazzura, 2004; Zattoni & 
Cuomo, 2008). Therefore, our expectation is that corporations with higher government ownership will 
actively lobby for government support by engaging in increased CSR disclosures. This is because 
winning the support of government as an influential stakeholder may not only help in legitimising 
corporate operations (moral and/or relational legitimation) (Aguilera et al., 2007), but also facilitate 
access to extra resources (economic efficiency), such as subsidies/tax holidays, which can enhance CFP 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Additionally, neo-institutional theory suggests that voluntarily adopting 
and/or copying good CSR practices can enhance efficiency and CFP by minimising agency conflicts 
between executives and government (as a powerful shareholder).  
However, prior evidence suggests that the effectiveness of government ownership in facilitating 
good CSR practices depends on the size and type of government ownership (Cressy et al., 2010; Hou & 
Moore, 2010; Johan & Najar, 2010). The evidence suggests that in countries with poor governance in the 
form of high levels of corruption and fraud, high government ownership can lead to poor CSR practices 
and vice-versa. For example, Jia et al. (2009), and Hou and Moore (2010) provide evidence that suggests 
that dominant Chinese government ownership is associated with poor monitoring and high levels of fraud. 
This implies that strong support through tight political connection in state-owned companies effectively 
minimises enforcement action by weak regulatory authorities and corrupt officials. Cumming et al. (2010) 
also find that private equity returns in Asia are higher in countries with higher levels of corruption. This 
suggests that the economic costs of corruption or cronyism can be mitigated by greater monitoring by 
activist fund managers, leading to higher efficiency and returns in the investee companies. 
Empirically, there is an acute lack of studies that examine the link between government 
ownership and CSR activities. However, Eng and Mak (2003), Tagesson et al. (2009), and Khan et al. 
(2012) find that government ownership is positively related to CSR practices, whilst Dam and Scholtens 
(2012) report that government ownership has a negative effect on CSR practices. Despite the mixed 
limited evidence, and following past suggestions and evidence (Jia et al., 2009; Hou & Moore, 2010),  we 
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expect a positive link between government ownership and CSR practices in countries, where government 
has low, but strategic ownership interests in most large corporations with great interest in CSR practices 
(Ntim et al., 2012b). Therefore, our second hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive association between government ownership and the extent of  
   CSR practices. 
 
Block Ownership.  From an efficiency-led perspective, higher managerial monitoring that is often 
associated with block ownership can be expected to reduce agency conflicts and thus, there is less 
demand for CSR disclosures from powerful stakeholders. From a legitimation perspective, the need for 
public accountability may be less of an issue in firms with concentrated ownership structures because of 
limited and less powerful outsider interests. In other words, closely held firms tend to be better at 
avoiding coercive, mimetic and normative institutional pressures to adopt new business practices, 
including CSR ones than their widely held counterparts. Consequently, managers of closely held firms 
tend to invest less in CSR because the costs of investing in such activities may outweigh their benefits 
(Khan et al., 2012). By contrast, managerial opportunism and conflict of interests are rife in firms with 
dispersed ownership structure (Oh et al., 2011). Thus, CSR disclosure can enhance efficiency and CFP for 
shareholders by acting as a bonding and monitoring mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between 
managers and diffused shareholders (Reverte, 2009).  
 Empirically, the literature is largely consistent with the view that concentrated ownership is 
associated with low CSR disclosures. For example, and in line with the findings of past studies (Haniffa 
& Cooke, 2005; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Reverte, 2009), Barnea and Rubin (2010) report that block 
ownership is negatively associated with CSR disclosures. Similarly, evidence by Arora and Dharwadkar 
(2011) suggests that managers of closely held firms engage in less CSR practices. The findings of more 
recent evidence (Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Oh et al., 2011; Khan et al., 2012) 
provide support for the view that ownership concentration leads to less CSR practices. Therefore, block 
ownership can be expected to impact negatively on CSR practices, and thus, our third hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a negative association between block ownership and the extent of CSR  
  practices.  
 
 11 
 
 
Institutional Ownership. Institutional shareholders have long been at the fore front of promoting the 
rapid proliferation of codes of good CG/CSR practices (Aguilera et al., 2006). From a legitimation 
perspective, institutional owners have financial, knowledge and information advantages over small 
shareholders. Institutional owners are, therefore, influential in corporate decision-making, including 
decisions on investment, executive appointment and disclosure (Oh et al., 2011). In particular, and 
because of their substantial ownership stakes, which they cannot easily sell, institutional shareholders 
have extra incentive to monitor corporate disclosures. Thus, large institutional shareholders can lobby 
corporate executives to engage in increased disclosures, including CSR ones. Furthermore, the relevance 
of CSR disclosures is heightened in the case of ethical investment funds, which explicitly rely on 
corporate social and environmental information to make investment decisions. This increased 
commitment to good CSR practices can enhance corporate legitimacy by winning the support of other 
powerful stakehoders, such as employees and governments, and also improve efficiency and CFP for 
shareholders by gaining access to critical resources.   
 However, the empirical evidence on the link between institutional shareholding and CSR 
practices is mixed. For instance, whilst Aguilera et al. (2006) report that differences in CG, including 
institutional shareholdings between the UK and US explain the differences in the extent of CSR activities, 
Dam and Scholtens (2012) find that institutional ownership has an insignificant effect on CSR disclosures. 
Similarly, whereas the findings of Barnea and Rubin (2010) suggest a negative connection between 
institutional ownership and CSR practices, recent evidence (see Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 
2012; Oh et al., 2011) suggests a positive association between the two variables. However, institutional 
owners tend to have larger ownership stakes in incorporations with a motive of making profit. Therefore, 
our expectation is that institutional owners are likely to actively seek to win the support of other powerful 
stakeholders, such as governments and employees by lobbying managers to project a more socially 
responsible image. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 4:  There is a positive association between institutional ownership and the extent of 
 CSR practices.  
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Board Size. Corporate boards perform two main strategic functions: conformance (e.g., monitoring 
compliance with rules and disciplining managers) and performance (e.g., providing advice and access to 
resources) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). From a neo-institutional perspective, larger boards 
are associated with higher managerial monitoring, which can improve efficiency and CFP for 
shareholders by ensuring conformance to corporate regulations and norms. This is because it is more 
difficult for a dominant CEO to control a larger board than a smaller one, and as such, executive decisions, 
including disclosure/CSR ones can effectively be scrutinised by larger boards. For example, Jia et al. 
(2009), and Hou and Moore (2010) report that larger Chinese supervisory boards are more likely to be 
punished for fraudulent behaviour, suggesting that greater monitoring is expected of larger boards. Thus, 
since CSR information is increasingly an important element of voluntary disclosures, we expect firms 
with larger boards to engage in good CSR practices than their smaller counterparts. Similarly, and from a 
legitimation perspective, larger boards are associated with greater diversity in terms of expertise, 
experience and stakeholder representation, which can enhance corporate reputation and image. The 
presence of diverse stakeholders on larger boards can lead to greater demand for different CSR activities, 
and therefore larger boards can be expected to engage in good CSR practices. 
 By contrast, others contend that larger boards are ineffective because of greater co-ordination and 
communication problems (Jensen, 1993). That is, as the size of the board increases, the tendency for 
directors to engage in free-riding and shirking of responsibilities also increases, leading to lower 
managerial monitoring. Hence, there is a greater risk of larger boards being dominated by powerful 
managers, which can impact negatively on corporate disclosures, including CSR practices.  
 Empirical evidence on the relationship between board size and CSR practices is generally rare, 
but Mackenzie (2007) reports that corporate boards have a positive impact on CSR disclosures, whereas 
Lindgreen et al. (2010) find that corporate boards have insignificant impact on CSR disclosures. Given 
the conflicting literature, however, our fifth hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 5:  There is an association between board size and the extent of CSR practices.  
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Independent Directors. From a neo-institutional perspective, it can be observed that a legitimacy gap 
inherently exists in modern companies, whereby ownership is separate from control. Indeed, at the core of 
the agency ‘problem’ is a lack of trust between managers and shareholders, which translates into a threat 
to, or concern about, the legitimacy of management’s decisions supposedly taken in the best interests of 
shareholders. This legitimacy threat could be miminised by electing independent directors to represent 
outside stakeholders. Hence, the appointment of independent directors constitutes a way of addressing the 
legitimacy gap by serving as a sign of congruence between corporate practices and societal or stakeholder 
expectations (Deegan, 2002). Therefore, the presence of independent directors can assist in improving 
efficiency and CFP for shareholders by reducing agency problems between executives and owners, and in 
advancing the interests of other stakeholders. Additionally, independent directors are perceived to be 
better at honouring the obligations of the firm, including CSR ones, as doing so may enhance their current 
and future reputation. Hence, independent directors may be more motivated to put pressure on managers 
to engage in good CSR practices. 
 Existing empirical evidence largely suggests that the presence of independent directors impacts 
positively on CSR practices. For example, and consistent with past evidence (Eng & Mak, 2003; Hillman 
et al., 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Barako & Brown, 2008; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008), Lattermann et 
al. (2009) report a positive effect of independent directors on CSR disclosures. Further, recent evidence 
by Harjoto and Jo (2011), Jo and Harjoto (2011, 2012), and Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) suggests that 
firms with higher proportion of independent directors tend to be more socially responsible. However, the 
effectiveness of independent directors in improving CSR practices depends on the context, including the 
legal environment, their expertise/experience, and independence. Therefore, our sixth hypothesis is that: 
Hypothesis 6:  There is a positive association between independent directors and the extent of 
 CSR practices.  
 
Board Diversity. Board diversity broadly refers to the various characteristics that may be present among 
directors that can influence decision-making (Van der Walt & Ingley, 2003). These attributes include 
those that are directly observable (age, gender, ethnicity, and nationality) and those that are less visible 
(religion, education, and occupation) (Mahadeo et al., 2012). In particular, ethnicity and gender are 
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topical issues of concern worldwide and have attracted the attention of national (e.g., Australia, Canada, 
Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, and US) and/or global institutions (e.g., the World Bank, EU, and 
OECD), leading, for instance, to prescriptions on how to improve gender/ethnic minority representation 
on corporate boards. Neo-institutional theory suggests that boards of diverse gender and ethnic 
backgrounds can help enhance efficiency and CFP for shareholders by linking a firm to its external 
environment and attract resources, as well as enhance corporate legitimacy. Similarly, boards of diverse 
ethnic and gender origins can increase board independence, which can enhance efficiency by improving 
managerial monitoring and performance. Specifically, recruiting female directors and directors from 
ethnic minorities can bring about diversity in ideas and opinions to board discussions. In line with this 
view, Carter et al. (2003) report that more diverse (i.e., on the basis of ethnicity and gender) US boards 
perform better than their less diverse counterparts. Additionally, corporate boards of diverse backgrounds 
can help provide a better link with stakeholders. This can further enhance growth opportunities, as well as 
generate stronger orientation towards CSR practices (Barako & Brown, 2008). Therefore, and given that 
the extent of CSR involvement is primarily an executive decision, we expect more diverse boards to put 
more pressure (especially by ethnic minorities and female members) on corporate managers to engage in 
increased CSR practices. 
 Empirical evidence on the effect of board diversity on CSR is generally scarce, although Haniffa 
and Cooke (2005), and Barako and Brown (2008) report that boards of diverse ethnic and gender 
backgrounds impact positively on CSR disclosures. Therefore, our seventh hypothesis is that:  
Hypothesis 7:  There is a positive association between board diversity on the basis of ethnicity  
   & gender, and the extent of CSR practices. 
 
The Link between CFP and CSR: The Moderating Effect of CG 
 
Informed by the neo-institutional perspective, we contend that CSR investments may be made for two 
main purposes: legitimation (social/moral/relational) and efficiency (instrumental) (Aguilera et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the expectation is that CSR may not necessarily have a strong link with CFP if corporations 
merely engage in CSR practices in response to regulative, cognitive and normative institutional forces in 
order to gain and improve corporate legitimacy. In contrast, if corporations show greater commitment to 
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good CSR practices in order to strategically enhance corporate efficiency, then CSR can be expected to 
have direct impact on CFP. In fact, there are two main contrasting theoretical views regarding the effect 
of CSR on CFP. One view is that socially responsible corporations incur costs that place them at an 
economic disadvantage compared with less responsible firms (Friedman, 1970; McGuire et al., 1988; 
Devinney, 2009), and thus leading to a negative CFP-CSR nexus. These costs include managerial 
opportunism (agency problems), socio-communal and environmental investments (financial), and 
ethically forgoing competitive investments/products, services and locations (strategic).  
 The alternative view is that being socially responsible can impact positively on CFP in a number 
of ways. First, engaging in CSR can enhance efficiency and CFP by reducing information asymmetry and 
agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Reverte, 2009). Second, greater commitment to CSR can 
improve CFP by facilitating conformance to social norms in order to legitimise corporate operations that 
may not only enhance corporate reputation and image, but also provide access to critical resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Suchman, 1995). Third, addressing the needs of 
powerful stakeholders, such as customers, governments, and employees, can enhance CFP by reducing 
political costs (litigation, regulation, taxation, and nationalisation), labour frictions, and customer 
boycotts (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
 Consistent with this conflicting set of theoretical perspectives, the considerable numbers of 
studies that have examined the CFP-CSR association report mixed evidence (McGuire et al., 1988; 
Nelling & Webb, 2009; Callado-Munoz & Ultrero-Gonzalez, 2011), although they are observably 
concentrated in a few developed countries with largely similar institutional contexts (Becchetti & Ciciretti, 
2009; Fifka, 2012). Whilst the mixed evidence has been widely attributed to methodological weaknesses 
arising from endogeneities and omitted variables (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Orlitzky et al., 2003), the 
findings of recent studies that sufficiently address such problems are still mixed (Bird et al., 2007; Lo & 
Sheu, 2007; Scholtens, 2007, 2008; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Cai et al., 2012; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012).  
 In contrast, there is significant evidence to suggest that CG impacts positively on CFP (see Bozec 
& Bozec, 2012). Therefore, and given that the decision to engage in good CSR activities emanates from 
 16 
 
 
corporate boards, we propose that CG is likely to have an enhancing effect on the CFP-CSR nexus. We 
base this conjecture on a new emerging theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests that although 
both CG and CSR disclosures are priced by the stock markets, CG disclosures have higher valuation than 
CSR ones (Jamali et al., 2008; Starks, 2009; Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a). That is, the 
potential positive effect of CSR practices on CFP is mainly through the likely positive impact of CG 
structures on CFP, and hence the profit creation is predominantly through CG rather than CSR practices.  
 More specifically, prior literature suggests a number of ways by which CG may heighten the link 
between CSR and CFP. First, Jamali et al. (2008) suggests that CG can be considered as a pillar, 
dimension of, and/or complement to CSR. CSR is, thus, conceptualised as an extension of good 
governance. This implies that in better-governed firms (i.e., firms depicting high levels of accountability, 
responsibility, and transparency), managers are more likely to engage in CSR practices as an important 
way of resolving genuine conflicts with stakeholders (Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012). In this case, CSR can 
have a positive effect on CFP due to the reduction of conflicts of interests with the various stakeholders 
through effective or good CG. By contrast, in poorly-governed firms (i.e., firms depicting high levels of 
corruption, fraud, and managerial entrenchment), negative/poor CSR practices are more likely to be 
adopted, which can exacerbate conflicts among the various stakeholders (Harjoto & Jo, 2011). This may 
be evident in the form of rampant labour strikes, consumer boycotts, and increased government 
intervention. Thus, CSR can have a negative effect on CFP through increased conflict of interests, 
resulting from ineffective or poor CG.  
 Second, good governance arising from corporate board structures, such as the presence of 
independent directors, board size, and board diversity can have a positive effect on CSR, and 
consequently CFP (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Jia et al., 2009). For example, strong managerial monitoring 
associated with the presence of independent directors can motivate managers to engage in sustainable 
CSR practices with potential favourable implications for CFP. Cumming et al. (2010), for instance, report 
that the returns of private equity funds are significantly higher in countries with higher levels of 
corruption. This suggests that even in corrupt countries, good governance can help activists fund 
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managers to mitigate the economic costs of corruption by enhancing efficiency in investee firms. Third, 
ownership structures (i.e., by block, government, and institutions) can mitigate or exacerbate agency 
problems (Eng & Mak, 2003; Barnea & Rubin, 2010; Hou & Moore, 2010). For instance, Hou and Moore 
(2010) show that increased monitoring associated with low government ownership in Chinese non-state 
owned enterprises impacts negatively on the incidence of corruption and fraud. Similarly, good 
governance in the form of greater activism by institutional shareholders can impact positively on CSR and 
CFP (Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012). A major problem, however, is that existing studies have predominantly 
investigated direct links between CSR and CFP without taking into consideration the potential interacting  
role of CG on the CSR-CFP link. Consequently, we seek to extend the literature by uniquely examining 
whether CG positively moderates the association between CFP and CSR, and therefore, our final 
hypothesis is that: 
           Hypothesis 8: The higher (lower) the CG quality, the more (less) positive is the relationship  
          between CSR and CFP. 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT AND DESIGN 
CG and CSR Policy Reforms and the South African Research Context 
Empirical studies of organisational behaviour informed by neo-institutional theory generally require a 
contextual grounding to situate the specific impact of cultural, economic, political, and social factors on 
the selected corporate practices (i.e., CG and CSR). In this respect, the current study focuses on reforms 
pursued in South Africa and the choice of the context is underpinned by a number of reasons. Major 
corporate collapses, especially in the developed economies, such as UK and US in the 1990s/2000s 
highlighted the importance of good CG, corporate accountability, social responsibility, transparency and 
disclosure practices (King Committee, 1994, 2002; Mallin, 2002; Judge, 2012). Gradually, and largely 
through global and/or national institutional impositions, CG codes and policy reforms have been 
disseminated to a large number of countries (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009; Cicon et al., 2012). Our general contention is that South Africa has been at the forefront of leading 
(‘cutting-edge’) CG/CSR reforms, with particular focus on addressing the governance challenges of 
corporations operating in developing countries (Mallin, 2006, 2007).2 Arguably, the pioneering nature of 
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the South Africa reforms implies that significant insights from the current study may be learnt by 
academics, regulators, managers, and policy-makers; especially those from emerging or transitional 
economies in Africa, America, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, experiencing similar cultural, 
economic, political, and social challenges. 
 More specifically, due to the need to address socio-economic problems, such as widespread 
poverty, high crime rate, and the legacy of inequality emanating from a long history of apartheid, CG 
reforms carried out in South Africa since the beginning of the 1990s have placed special emphasis on 
improving CG practices broadly for both shareholders and stakeholders (Ntim et al., 2012b). In contrast, 
CG reforms that have been pursued in most Anglo-American countries have primarily focused narrowly 
on enhancing shareholder-related protections (Cicon et al., 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a) and the emergence 
of a stakeholder-oriented model of CG practice only arose about a decade after the South African 
experience (e.g., the first OECD model was published in 1999, whilst the Global Reporting Initiative’s 
popular triple bottom line reporting framework was first issued in 2000). Hence, this created a natural and 
distinct setting, whereby the links among CSR, CG and CFP can be explored. Furthermore, with respect 
to reforms pursued in South Africa, the 1994 Report (King I) adopted the ‘integrated’ CG approach 
(Mallin, 2006; Ntim et al., 2012a, b). The ‘integrated’ CG approach encourages corporations to go beyond 
the usual narrow financial aspects of CG and take into consideration a number of broader stakeholder 
(CSR) concerns, such as those regarding the environment, health, safety, and affirmative action (King 
Committee, 2002; Mallin, 2007; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
 This trend persisted in the later report (King II)3, which further distinguished the South African 
CG model from other Anglo-American ones by formally adopting the ‘inclusive” CG approach (Ntim et 
al., 2012a, b; Soobaroyen & Ntim, 2013). The “inclusive” CG approach builds on and expands the Anglo-
American (‘shareholding’) features of King I, as well as encourages corporations to comply with a broad 
range of affirmative action and stakeholder (‘stakeholding – CSR’) issues meant to address the resulting 
historical socio-economic inequalities between white and non-white South Africans. These include 
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provisions on black economic empowerment (BEE)4, environment, ethics, health and safety, HIV/Aids, 
and social investments (see Appendix; King Committee, 2002; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). 
In addition, corporate ownership in South Africa has been and remains highly concentrated, 
reflecting the traditional inter-relations and inter-dependencies between a small/white-dominated business 
elite and more contemporarily, the opening up of corporate ownership to government-backed entities or 
individuals (Ntim et al., 2012a). This concentration is apparent from the existence of complex cross 
shareholdings and tall pyramid-shaped ownership structures by a small number of very large corporations 
(King Committee, 2002; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013).5 In particular, through the Public Investment 
Commission, the South African government maintains strategic, but low ownership stakes in a number of 
large corporations with keen interests in CG and CSR practices (Ntim et al., 2012a, b; Soobaroyen & 
Ntim, 2013). Apart from the concentrated and government ownership features, shareholder activism is 
observably weak along with a noticeable poor record of implementing and enforcing corporate 
regulations (King Committee, 2002; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). These contextual developments appear 
to have substantially impaired the effectiveness of the market for corporate and managerial control in 
South Africa (Henry, 2008). Consequently, managerial entrenchment and expropriation of minority 
wealth is widespread (Ntim et al., 2012a, b), with potentially adverse implications for CFP and CSR.  
Thus, in summary, although South Africa has arguably pursued a combination of CG and CSR 
reforms compared with other Anglo-American countries, critical concerns have been raised as to whether 
a voluntary compliance regime like King II, can effectively improve CG and CSR standards. Therefore, 
we seek to investigate the relationship between CG and CSR practices, and consequently, examine 
whether CG has any influence on the link between CFP and CSR.  
 
Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 
We focus on an initial sample of 291 non-financial firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange over 
the 2002-2009 period from 5 main industries: basic materials; consumer goods; consumer services; 
industrials; and technology/telecoms. Since financials/utilities are subject to different regulatory oversight 
and capital structure restrictions that can impact 
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industries are not included in the sample, as is the case in previous studies (Henry, 2008; Reverte, 2009). 
To be included in our final sample, a firm’s CFP, CG and CSR data must be available for each of the 8 
years. The criterion was set for a number of reasons. First, in line with previous studies (Scholtens, 2008; 
Oh et al., 2011), it ensured that the conditions for a balanced panel analysis would be met. Some of the 
advantages for using panel data include having both time-series and cross-sectional observations, and less 
multicollinearity among the variables (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Second, examination of eight-
year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may be useful in detecting whether the 
observed cross-sectional links among CFP, CG and CSR holds over time. Third, as King II became 
operational in 2002 and ended in 2009, our sample period covers this period.  
 Twenty-eight and 94 firms, had no and incomplete data, respectively, leaving us with a total of 
169 firms. However, given the extensiveness of the CG and CSR data, coupled with the labour-intensive 
nature of manual data collection, an additional sample limitation exercise became necessary. As past 
evidence indicates that company size and industry affect CG and CSR practices (Collett & Hrasky, 2005; 
Campbell et al., 2003, 2006), we selected the largest 15 corporations from each of the five industries 
based on their market capitalisation in order to control for size and industry. Thus, our final sample 
consisted of 75 corporations over eight firm-years, giving a total of 600 firm-year observations from five 
main industries for our regression analyses. The CG and CSR variables were extracted from both the 
sampled companies’ annual (600) and sustainability (62) reports collected from the Perfect Information 
Database, while the financial variables were obtained from DataStream.  
 A potential limitation of our sample selection criteria is that it may introduce survivorship bias 
into the sample selection process. However, the criteria generated a reasonable number of observations 
and therefore, generalisability of the findings of our study should arguably not be affected by our sample 
selection criteria. To be certain, however, we further explored this potential problem by following 
Graham and Harvey (2001) and Beiner et al. (2006) and compare the characteristics of our final 75 
sampled firms to those of the 263 out of the initial 291 with at least one year’s financial data available 
rather than the complete eight years. Specifically, we test for equality in means and medians of all our 
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financial variables, including Capital expenditure, Firm size, Leverage, Return on assets, Sales growth, 
Tobin’s Q, and Total share returns, between our final balanced sample of 75 and the unbalanced sample 
of 263. If the two groups depict similar characteristics, then we can conclude that our final sample is 
representative of the underlying population. The results (which for brevity are not reported, but available 
upon request) indicate that there are no statistically significant differences in the mean or median values 
for all the variables. We interpret this observation as indicating that the characteristics of our final 75 
sample are largely similar to the underlying population and that our findings are not likely to be seriously 
impaired by survivorship bias. 
 
Measures and Variables 
We classify our variables into six main types and Table 1 contains full definitions of all of them. First, 
and to test Hypotheses 1 to 7, our main dependent variables are the summary CSR practice scores based 
on the CSR word count (CSR index), which seeks to measure6 the quantity (quality) of CSR disclosures in 
six broad areas as set out by King II, consisting of both South African context-specific [(i) (BEE word 
count or sub-index); and (ii) HIV/Aids (HIV word count or sub-index)] and general/conventional [(iii) 
environment (Environment word count or sub-index); (iv) ethics (Ethics word count or sub-index); (v) 
health and safety (Health and safety word count or sub-index); and (vi) social investment (Social 
investment word count or sub-index)] CSR. This constitutes one of the most extensive CSR data to be 
used to-date and we used the content analysis method of codifying written texts into various categories to 
collect all our CSR data (Hackston & Milne, 1996; Unerman, 2000). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 Second, and to test Hypothesis 1, our main independent variable is a binary CG disclosure index, 
containing 41 CG provisions based on King II covering four broad sections: (i) boards, directors and 
ownership; (ii) accounting and auditing; (iii) risk management, internal audit and control; and (iv) 
compliance and enforcement. For brevity, the detailed discussions of the 41 CG provisions are presented 
in the Appendix of Ntim et al. (2012a). Third, and to test Hypotheses 2 to 7, we collect data on ownership, 
including Block ownership, Government ownership, and Institutional ownership, and on board 
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characteristics, including Board size, Independent directors, and Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity 
and gender. Fourth, and to test for the moderating effect of CG on the CSR-CFP link (Hypothesis 8), we 
create an interaction variable between our CG index and CSR disclosures. Also, and in testing Hypothesis 
8, we employ Tobin’s Q as our main measure for CFP, but as a sensitivity check, we use Total share 
returns and Return on assets as alternative market and accounting-based CFP measures, respectively. 
Finally, and to control for potential omitted variables bias (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010), we include 
an extensive number of control variables. These include Audit firm size, Capital expenditure, Cross-
listing, The presence of a CG committee, The presence of a CSR committee, Leverage, Firm size, Risk, 
Sales growth, Industry dummies, and Year dummies. For brevity, we do not develop direct theoretical 
links between these control variables and CSR or CFP, but there is extensive theoretical and empirical 
literature that suggests they can potentially affect either CSR or CFP (McGuire et al., 1988; Beiner et al., 
2006; Henry, 2008; Reverte, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a; Fifka, 2013).   
We present the empirical analyses, including the descriptive statistics, bivariate and multivariate 
regression analyses, and robustness analyses in the following sections. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
Summary Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Regression Analyses 
Table 2 contains summary descriptive statistics of the variables. For brevity, we do not conduct detailed 
discussions, but it generally suggests that both our quantity (CSR word count) and quality (CSR index) 
CSR measures display wide variations. For example, CSR word count (CSR index) ranges from a 
minimum of 186 (6.19%) to a maximum of 23,371 (77.32%) with an average of 4,081 (56.42%) words. 
This suggests that there is a great degree of heterogeneity in terms of the importance that South African 
corporations attach to CSR disclosures. The six sub CSR disclosure variables, namely BEE word count 
(BEE sub-index), Environment word count (Environment sub-index), Ethics word count (Ethics sub-
index), HIV word count (HIV sub-index), Health and safety word count (Health and safety sub-index), 
and Social investment word count (Social investment sub-index) depict similar wide variations. 
Observably, and consistent with its six broad dimensions, BEE word count has the largest number of 
 23 
 
 
word count disclosures, ranging from a minimum (maximum) of 50 (8,347) with a mean of 1,334 words. 
By contrast, Ethics word count has the least level of disclosures, ranging from a minimum (maximum) of 
10 (222) with a median of 150 words.   
 The CG (CG index, Board diversity, Board size, Block ownership, Government ownership, 
Independent directors, and Institutional ownership), CFP (Tobin’s Q, Total share return, and Return on 
assets), and control (Audit firm size, Capital expenditure, The presence of a CG committee, Cross-listing, 
The presence of a CSR committee, Leverage, Firm size, Risk, and Sales growth) all display similar wide 
spreads. For instance, the CG index ranges from a minimum of 4.88% to a maximum of 100% with the 
median corporation complying with 73.17% of the 41 CG provisions, whereas the average Board size is 
11 with a minimum (maximum) of 4 (21) directors. This seems to suggest that the sampled corporations 
have been adequately selected, and thus minimises the possibilities of sample selection bias that have 
arguably characterised most past studies.  
 Further, and to inform our analyses, we split our sample into two sub-samples – firms with high 
(i.e., firms with CSR index score above the overall mean/median mark) and low (i.e., firms with CSR 
score below the overall mean/median mark) CSR scores. Columns 8 and 9 of Table 2 contain the results 
of the test (t-test) of comparison of differences in means and medians for our main independent variables. 
The results generally show that there are significant differences in means and medians between the two 
sub-samples. For example, the mean between the two groups is significantly different as follows: CG 
index (8.75, p<0.001); Board diversity (6.48, p<0.001); Board size (1.85, p<0.100); Block ownership (-
4.76, p<0.001); Government ownership (2.39, p<0.010); Independent directors (2.30, p<0.050); and 
Institutional ownership (-4.96, p<0.001). Briefly, the results imply that firms with better CG scores, more 
diverse boards, larger boards, high government ownership, and more independent directors show greater 
commitment to CSR practices. By contrast, firms with high block ownership and institutional ownership 
engage in low CSR disclosures. With the exception of Institutional ownership, all the results (which will 
be discussed in detail in the next subsection) are consistent with our hypotheses. The results of differences 
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in medians presented in Column 9 of Table 2 for the two sub-samples are largely similar to those reported 
for the means.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Table 3 reports the correlation matrix for the variables to test for multicollinearity. For robust 
findings, we present both the Pearson’s parametric and Spearman’s non-parametric coefficients and, 
noticeably, the magnitude and direction of both coefficients are largely similar, and this indicates the 
absence of any serious non-normality problems. Observably, the correlations among the variables are also 
fairly low and thus, suggest that no major multicollinearities are present. Additionally, we calculate 
variance inflation factors for these variables, with their values (see Column 7 of Table 2), ranging from 
1.06 to 3.97. This provides further support for the correlation analysis that our regression models do not 
suffer from any serious multicollinearities. Of interest and as hypothesised (i.e., focusing on Pearson’s 
parametric correlation coefficients only), the CG index (0.480, p<0.001), Board diversity (0.118, 
p<0.010), Board size (0.122, p<0.001), Government ownership (0.165, p<0.001), and Independent 
directors (0.187, p<0.001) are positively associated with the CSR index, whilst Block ownership (-0.130, 
p<0.010) is negatively related to the CSR index. The negative link between Institutional ownership (-
0.162, p<0.001) and CSR index is again inconsistent with our hypothesis. Additionally, there are 
significant links among the CSR, CG, CFP and the control variables. For instance, Audit firm size (0.336, 
p<0.001), The presence of a CG committee (0.384, p<0.001), Cross-listing (0.469, p<0.001), The 
presence of a CSR committee (0.391, p<0.001), and Firm size (0.212, p<0.001) are positively connected 
to the CSR index, whereas Capital expenditure (-0.010, p>0.100) and Leverage (-0.038, p>0.100) are 
negative, but insignificantly related to the CSR index. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Multivariate Regression Analyses 
Corporations usually vary in terms of the difficulties and prospects that they face over time (Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010). This can lead to a scenario whereby CSR and CG practices are jointly and dynamically 
influenced by unobserved firm-specific hetereogeneities, such as executive talent, corporate culture, and 
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complexity (Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009), which simple OLS regressions may fail to identify (Gujarati, 
2003; Wooldridge, 2010). Hence, given the panel nature of our data and following past studies (Henry, 
2008; Guest, 2009; Ntim et al., 2012a), we conduct our analyses by using panel data regression 
techniques so as to control for potential endogeneities that may emerge from unobserved company-
specific heterogeneities. Therefore, we start our analyses with a basic fixed-effects regression model 
specified as follows:                   
                                  ni itiitiitit CONTROLSCGICSRD 110                                        (1) 
where the CSRD is either our quality (CSR index) or quantity (CSR word count) proxy for CSR 
disclosures, CGI is the CG disclosure index and CONTROLS refers to the control variables, including 
Audit firm size, Capital expenditure, The presence of a CG committee, Cross-listing, The presence of a 
CSR committee, Leverage, Firm size, Risk, Sales growth, Independent directors, Industry dummies, and 
Year dummies, with γ referring to the company-specific fixed-effects, consisting of a vector of the mean-
differences of all time variant variables.7  
 Table 4 contains fixed-effects regression results of the effects of CG on CSR based on our quality 
CSR measure (CSR index). First, we investigate whether our CG index influences the CSR index. The 
coefficient of the CSR index on the CG index in Model 1 of Table 4 is positive (0.203, t = 3.968, 
p<0.001), thereby providing support for Hypothesis 1. The policy implication is that, on average, better-
governed corporations are more likely to pursue a more socially responsible agenda. The economic 
significance of this evidence is that a one-standard deviation change (i.e., increase) in the CG index can be 
expected to be associated with about a 3.3% (16.30 x 0.203) change (i.e., increase) in the CSR index.   
 Theoretically, the evidence appears to be consistent with the predictions of our generalised neo-
institutional framework, which places special emphasis on legtimation and efficiency motives for 
corporate engagement in CSR activities. For example, compliance with good CG rules (due to 
coercive/regulative institutional pressures) in the form of increased CSR practices can enhance the 
legitimacy of corporate structures and operations by improving corporate reputation (Scott, 1987; 
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Suchman, 1995). Similarly, and even in the absence of regulative institutional forces, better-governed 
corporations may voluntarily mimic and/or adopt good CSR practices in order to improve efficiency and 
CFP by obtaining access to critical resources, such as finance, contracts, and skilled labour by gaining the 
approval of influential stakeholders (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Freeman, 1984). Empirically, the evidence 
provides support for both the recommendations of King II and the similar results of the few past studies 
(Jamali et al., 2008; Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012).  
Insert Table 4 about here 
Second, and to ascertain whether the ownership and board characteristics affect CSR, we re-estimate 
equation (1) by replacing the CG index with the six alternative CG mechanisms. Generally, we find in 
Model 2 of Table 4 that all our six alternative CG mechanisms are predictive of CSR practices. 
Specifically, Government ownership is positively associated with the CSR index (0.183, t = 3.859, 
p<0.001), strongly providing empirical support for Hypothesis 2. Economically, our evidence is 
significant because it suggests that a one-standard deviation increase (decrease) in Government ownership 
will be associated with about a 1.8% (9.65 x 0.183) increase (decrease) in the CSR index. Theoretically, 
and at the societal level, governments can pass laws to regulate (i.e., the coercive power of the State) the 
behaviour of the lower members of society. Therefore, demonstrating greater commitment to CSR can 
win the support of government as an influential stakeholder, which may not only help in legitimising 
corporate operations (Aguilera et al., 2007), but also in enhancing efficiency by facilitating access to extra 
resources, such as subsidies/tax holidays (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Further, and even without the 
regulative power of the State, neo-institutional theory indicates that voluntarily adopting and/or 
mimicking good CSR practices can enhance efficiency and CFP by reducing agency problems between 
managers and government (as a powerful shareholder). Empirically, the positive Government ownership-
CSR index link contradicts the evidence of negative effect by Dam and Scholtens (2012), but provides 
support for similar findings by Eng and Mak (2003), Tagesson et al. (2009), and Khan et al. (2012). 
Block ownership exerts a strong negative pressure on the CSR index (-0.170, t = 3.783, p<0.001); 
thus Hypothesis 3 is empirically supported. The economic implication of this evidence is that a one-
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standard deviation increase (decrease) in Block ownership will be associated with about a 3.7% (21.50 x 
0.170) decrease (increase) in the CSR index. Theoretically, the need for public accountability and 
legitimacy is less of a concern in firms with concentrated ownership structures because of limited outsider 
interests. Therefore, firms with concentrated ownership have greater capacity to avoid regulative, 
cognitive and normative institutional demands to adopt new CSR practices than their counterparts with 
disperse ownership structure. Also, block ownership is associated with greater managerial monitoring, 
which can minimise agency costs, and hence, less demand for CSR disclosures from powerful 
stakeholders. As such, it seems economically efficient for managers of closely held firms to invest less in 
CSR activities because the costs of investing in such activities may be higher than their benefits (Khan et 
al., 2012). Empirically, our evidence is in line with the results of past studies that suggest that ownership 
concentration leads to less CSR disclosures (Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Reverte, 2009; Jo & Harjoto, 
2011, 2012).  
Institutional ownership shows a weak negative association with the CSR index (-0.115, t = 1.920, 
p<0.100), and therefore Hypothesis 4 is rejected. Empirically, the negative link between the CSR index 
and Institutional ownership supports the findings of Barnea and Rubin (2010), but is inconsistent with 
past evidence as to the absence of a relationship (Dam & Scholtens, 2012) or a positive one (Aguilera et 
al., 2006; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Oh et al., 2011). These results might be 
explained by the peculiarities of institutional ownership in South Africa. Given the pervasiveness of 
pyramidal structures/cross-shareholdings within the South African corporate context (Ntim et al., 2012b), 
this finding appears to indicate that institutional shareholders are more likely to be block-owners, who can 
directly monitor managers instead of relying on CSR disclosures. The significant positive connection 
between Block ownership and Institutional ownership in Table 3 seems to support this interpretation. 
Theoretically, the negative effect of Institutional ownership on the CSR index also means that our neo-
institutional theoretical prediction that due to their substantial ownership stakes, large institutional 
shareholders can be expected to put coercive, cognitive and normative pressures on corporate executives 
to engage in increased CSR disclosures, which can legitimise corporate operations and enhance efficiency, 
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may not be applicable within corporate contexts, such as South Africa, where institutional shareholders 
are also more likely to be block-owners. 
 With respect to our board variables, Board size is discernibly positive, but weakly associated with 
the CSR index (0.108, t = 1.908, p<0.100), and thereby providing empirical support for Hypothesis 5. The 
positive effect of Board size on the CSR index provides support for similar findings by Mackenzie (2007), 
but contradicts the results of Lindgreen et al. (2010). The evidence is also consistent with predictions of 
our overarching neo-institutional theoretical framework. From a legitimation view, larger boards are 
associated with greater diversity in terms of stakeholder representation, which can enhance corporate 
reputation and image. The presence of diverse stakeholders on larger boards can, therefore, lead to greater 
demand for different CSR activities. Additionally, larger boards are associated with higher managerial 
monitoring, which can improve efficiency and CFP for shareholders by ensuring conformance to 
corporate regulations and norms, including international CSR practices. 
 Observably, Independent directors is positively related to the CSR index (0.126, t = 2.046, 
p<0.050); thus Hypothesis 6 is empirically supported. Economically, our evidence implies that a one-
standard deviation increase (decrease) in the percentage of Independent directors will be associated with 
about a 2.2% (17.85 x 0.126) increase (decrease) in the CSR index. Theoretically, the appointment of 
independent directors constitutes a way of enhancing legitimacy by serving as a sign of congruence 
between corporate practices and societal expectations. Similarly, the presence of independent directors 
can help to improve efficiency and CFP for shareholders by reducing agency problems between 
executives and owners, as well as advance the interests of other stakeholders. Thus, independent directors 
may be more motivated to put pressure on managers to engage in good CSR practices. Empirically, our 
evidence provides support for the findings of past studies that suggest that the presence of independent 
directors impacts positively on CSR practices (Hillman et al., 2001; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; Lattermann 
et al., 2009; Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). 
 Finally, Board diversity displays a strong positive relationship with the CSR index (0.156, t = 
3.539, p<0.001); thus implying that Hypothesis 6 is supported by our data. Our finding means that a one-
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standard deviation increase (decrease) in Board diversity will be associated with about a 2.7% (17.35 x 
1.56) increase (decrease) in the CSR index – implying that our evidence is economically significant. 
Empirically, our finding is consistent with that of Haniffa and Cooke (2005), and Barako and Brown 
(2008) who report that diverse boards make more CSR disclosures. The evidence is also in line with our 
theoretical framework, which suggests that boards of diverse gender and ethnic backgrounds can help 
improve efficiency by connecting a firm to its external environment and attracting resources, as well as 
enhancing corporate legitimacy. Similarly, boards of diverse ethnic and gender origins can increase board 
independence and decision-making, which can improve efficiency by enhancing managerial monitoring 
and performance. Additionally, we include the CG index together with the six alternative CG mechanisms 
in Model 3 of Table 4, but the central tenor of our findings for all six hypotheses remains largely 
unchanged. In sum, all our CG variables are able to predict a firm’s CSR practices, with the findings 
providing empirical support for an overarching neo-institutional framework that puts greater emphasis on 
legitimation and efficiency motives to explain corporate engagement in CSR activities – whether such a 
commitment is driven by coercive/regulative, cognitive/mimetic and normative pressures. 
Third, our findings suggest that differences in the CSR index can largely be explained by the CG 
mechanisms, but since it consists of CSR disclosures from six different themes, it is possible for the effect 
of CG on each category to differ, with some potentially having strong connections with the CG variables 
and others having weak associations. Thus, to examine the association between each CSR theme and the 
CG variables, we again re-estimate equation (1) by replacing the CSR index with the BEE sub-index, 
Environment sub-index, Ethics sub-index, HIV sub-index, Health and safety sub-index, or Social 
investment sub-index at a time, and the findings are, respectively, presented in Models 4 to 9 of Table 4. 
With limited exceptions (such as the insignificant CG index-Health and safety sub-index, Board size-
Ethics sub-index, Board diversity-Environment sub-index, Block ownership-Ethics sub-index, Block 
ownership-Health and safety sub-index, Government ownership-Ethics sub-index, and Institutional 
ownership-Ethics sub-index links), the findings are largely consistent with our previous evidence that 
corporations with good governance, high government ownership, larger boards, diverse boards, and 
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independent boards are more predisposed to be socially responsible than those with high block 
shareholding, and high institutional shareholding. The apparent sensitivity of our findings presented in 
Table 4 also suggests that the CG-CSR nexus may vary depending on the type of CSR practices. For 
example, the link between BEE sub-index and the CG mechanisms is generally strong, whilst the Ethics 
sub-index-CG nexus is relatively weak. 
Additionally, the coefficients on the control variables in Models 1 to 9 of Table 4 generally show 
the predicted signs. For instance, Audit firm size, The presence of a CG committee, Cross-listing, The 
presence of a CSR committee, and Firm size are positively associated with the CSR index, as well as with 
all its six sub-categories, as expected. Consistent with the results of prior studies (Gray et al., 1995a; 
Hackston & Milne, 1996; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008; Young & Marais, 2012), CSR disclosure 
significantly varies across different industries and years (for brevity, we do not report these in Table 4, 
but available on request). Noticeably, our results suggest that CSR disclosure is significantly less in 2002 
and in the technology industry, but significantly more in 2009 and in the basic materials industry (highest 
significant coefficient) compared with the other years and industries, respectively. 
Finally, and to investigate whether CSR influences CFP, we estimate a basic fixed-effects 
regression model specified as follows:  
         ni itiitiitit CONTROLSCSRDCFP 110                                        (2) 
whereby CFP refers to our financial performance proxies (Tobin’s Q, Return on assets, and Total share 
return), and CSRD is either our quality (CSR index) or quantity (CSR word count) proxy for CSR 
disclosures, whilst the rest remain the same as defined in equation (1).  
Table 5 reports fixed-effects regression results of the effects of CSR on CFP. Since existing 
studies have predominantly simply regressed CSR on CFP, we begin our analysis by similarly regressing 
the CSR index with the control variables on Tobin’s Q. Positive, but insignificant coefficient on the CSR 
index (0.033, t = 1.360, p>0.100) is discernible in Model 1 of Table 5. To ascertain whether this evidence 
may be due to the use of the quality CSR measure, we replace the CSR index with its quantity alternative 
(CSR word count) in equation (2). Noticeably, the result in Model 2 of Table 5 depicts a positive 
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coefficient on the CSR word count (0.028, t = 1.325, p>0.100), but equally insignificant and thereby 
providing support for the findings of a large number of studies that suggest that there is a positive, but 
weak direct link between CFP and CSR (McGuire et al., 1988; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Bird et al., 2007; Lo 
& Sheu, 2007; Cai et al., 2012).  
 Whilst our evidence is largely consistent with the findings of prior studies that similarly include 
extensive number of controls, such as risk (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Nelling & Webb, 2009), we 
contend that the CFP-CSR connection can possibly be enhanced by CG. Our conjecture is based on the 
extensive evidence, which suggests that CG influences CFP (Gompers et al., 2003; Renders et al., 2010, 
Bozec & Bozec, 2012), as well as emerging theoretical and empirical evidence (Jamali et al., 2008; Stark, 
2009; Arora & Dharwadkar, 2011; Ntim et al., 2012a), which indicates that the positive effect of CG on 
CFP is stronger than that of CSR. Therefore, to ascertain whether CG positively moderates the CFP-CSR 
link, we re-estimate equation (2) by including the CSR*CG index, which is a variable created by 
interacting the CSR index (CSR word count) and CG index. We also include the CG index on its own to 
control for potential upward bias (over-estimating) in the coefficients. Observably, the respective 
coefficient of Tobin’s Q on the CSR index (0.136, t = 3.420, p<0.001) and CSR word count (0.122, t = 
2.960, p<0.050) in Models 3 and 4 of Table 5 is positive, and thereby providing new evidence, which 
supports Hypothesis 8 that the CFP-CSR connection is significantly and positively enhanced by CG. The 
economic significance of our evidence is that a one-standard deviation increase (decrease) in the CSR 
index, for example, will be associated with about a 2.2% (16.19 x 0.136) increase (decrease) in the 
Tobin’s Q. Theoretically, our evidence is consistent with the predictions of our overarching neo-
institutional framework that places special emphasis on the efficiency and legitimation effects of CSR 
engagement. Our evidence implies that in better-governed firms (i.e., firms depicting high levels of 
accountability, responsibility, and transparency), managers are more likely to undertake positive CSR 
practices that can help legitimise corporate operations by ensuring congruence with stewardship interests 
and higher-order values (i.e., moral imperative) (Aguilera et al., 2007). From an efficiency perspective, 
our evidence implies better-governed firms have greater propensity to engage in good CSR practices, 
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which can enhance corporate efficiency, and meet instrumental and relational imperatives. Thus, good CG 
can act as a positive catalyst on the CFP-CSR nexus by helping to reduce conflict of interests among the 
various stakeholders (Harjoto & Jo, 2011; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012).  
 Further, to ascertain whether the board and ownership characteristics can positively heighten the 
CFP-CSR nexus, we include interaction variables for the six alternative CG variables using both the 
quality (CSR index) and quantity (CSR word count) CSR proxies in Models 5 and 6 of Table 5, 
respectively, with the coefficient on the CSR index (0.138, t = 3.459, p<0.001) and CSR word count 
(0.133, t = 3.442, p<0.001) remaining positive. The positive coefficient on CSR*Government ownership 
(Model 5: 0.186, t = 3.863, p<0.001)(Model 6: 0.172, t = 3.789, p<0.001), CSR*Board diversity (Model 5: 
0.182, t = 3.865, p<0.001)(Model 6: 0.178, t = 3.795, p<0.001) and CSR*Independent directors (Model 5: 
0.121, t = 3.527, p<0.001)(Model 6: 0.113, t = 2.784, p<0.050) also provides new evidence, which 
suggests that the CFP-CSR nexus is further significantly and positively strengthened by the presence of 
government ownership, diverse boards, and independent boards. To check whether the ability of the CG 
index to positively intensify the CFP-CSR nexus will be affected by the presence of the alternative CG 
structures, we include interaction variables for the six alternative CG variables, as well as all seven CG 
mechanisms in Models 7 to 9 of Table 5, with the results remaining qualitatively the same as those 
reported in Models 3 and 4 of Table 5.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Additional Analyses 
We conduct a number of additional analyses to ascertain the robustness of our evidence. First, as a 
robustness check, we replicate our results in Table 4 by replacing our quality CSR measure (CSR index) 
with its quantity alternative (CSR word count), and the results are reported in Table 6. Apart from a few 
sensitivities (such as the insignificant CG index-Ethics word count, Block ownership-Ethics word count, 
and Block ownership-Health and safety word count links), the results in Models 1 to 9 of Table 6 are 
essentially similar to those reported in Table 4, implying that our evidence is fairly robust to the use of a 
quantitative (word counts) or qualitative (disclosure indices) measure of CSR practices.  
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Insert Table 6 about here 
Second, several studies suggest that the effect of some CG mechanisms, such as Block ownership, Board 
size, and Institutional ownership on CFP is non-linear (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Chen et al., 2008). 
For example, Block ownership, Board size, and Institutional ownership have been found to be non-
monotonically related to CFP by Morck et al. (1988), Andre (2008), and Coles et al. (2008), respectively. 
To ascertain the presence of non-linear links among these three CG structures, CFP, and CSR, we re-
estimate equations 1 and 2 by including squared transformations of Block ownership, Board size, and 
Institutional ownership. Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 contain the findings for the CG-CSR nexus and CFP-
CSR link, respectively. Observably, the coefficients on Block ownership2 (Model 1: -0.023, t = 0.345, 
p>0.100)(Model 2: -0.013, t = 0.320, p>0.100), Board size2 (Model 1: 0.032, t = 0.526, p>0.100)(Model 
2: 0.036, t = 0.552, p>0.100)and Institutional ownership2 (Model 1: -0.034, t = 0.545, p<0.100)(Model 2: 
-0.029, t = 0.353, p>0.100) in Models 1 and 2 of Table 7 are insignificant, with the rest of the results 
remaining largely the same as our previous findings contained in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. Thus, our 
evidence does not provide support for the existence of curvilinear (including other transformation, such as 
cubic) links among CFP, CG, and CSR.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
 Third, a number of studies suggest that investments in advertising, and research & development (R&D) 
impact positively on CFP (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012). Thus, failing to 
control for advertising and R&D expenditure could result in misspecified equation with the coefficient on 
the CSR index being biased upwards. To account for such potential equation misspecification, we include 
Advertising expenditure and R&D expenditure, as additional control variables in Model 3 of Table 7. The 
coefficient on Advertising expenditure is positive (0.165, t = 3.647, p<0.001), whilst the coefficient on 
R&D expenditure is negative (-0.048, t = 0.780, p>0.100), but insignificant. The coefficient on the CSR 
index remains positive (0.135, = 3.463, p<0.001), but slightly sensitive – decreasing from 0.140 in Model 
7 of Table 5 to 0.135 in Model 3 of Table 7. 
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 Fourth, following Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we additionally address potential endogeneities 
by estimating: a lagged CSR-CFP structure and two-stage least squares (2SLS). To address simultaneity 
problems that may arise due to the presence of a lagged CSR-CFP connection, we follow past research 
(McGuire et al., 1988) to re-estimate equation (2) as a lagged structure specified as:  
                                  ni itiitiitit CONTROLSCSRDCFP 1 11110                                  (3) 
where everything remains the same as defined in equation (2) except that we include a one year lag 
between CFP and CSR in which current year’s CFP depends on previous year’s CSR. The positive 
coefficient of Tobin’s Q on the CSR index (0.130, t = 3.406, p<0.001) is noticeable in Model 4 of Table 7, 
with the results being generally similar to those presented in Models 3 to 9 of Table 5. This suggests that 
our evidence is largely robust to estimating a lagged CFP-CSR structure.8  
 To account for potential endogeneities that may be caused by omitted variable bias, we rely on 
the widely used two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008). However, 
to ensure that the 2SLS methodology is ideal, and following Beiner et al. (2006), we first implement 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test (Beiner et al., 2006: 267) to test for the existence of an endogenous 
connection between Tobin’s Q and the CSR index. Applied to equation (2), the test rejects the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity, and hence, we conclude that the 2SLS methodology may be appropriate and 
that our fixed-effects results may be misleading. This implies that we need to replace the CSR index with 
an instrument, which is highly correlated with the CSR index (relevant), but lowly or uncorrelated with 
the regression structural errors (valid). Obtaining a ‘relevant’ and ‘valid’ instrument is generally difficult 
(Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). As a result, we follow the widely used two-stage procedure (Beiner 
et al., 2006; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Jo & Harjoto, 2011, 2012). In the first stage, based on extensive 
theoretical and empirical literature (Gray et al., 1995; Adams, 2002; Deegan, 2002; Fifka, 2013), we 
conjecture that the CSR index will be influenced by all our CG and control variables, including 
Advertising expenditure and R&D expenditure. In the second stage, we employ the predicted part of the 
CSR index (Predicted CSR index) as an instrument9 for the CSR index and re-run equation (2) as follows: 
 35 
 
 
                                ni itiitiitit CONTROLSCSRDCFP 110 ˆ                                        (4)           
where everything remains unchanged as specified in equation (2) except that we use the predicted CSR 
index (Predicted CSR index) from the first-stage estimation as an instrument for the CSR index. The 
coefficients on the Predicted CSR index (0.175, t = 3.790, p<0.001) and CSR*CG index (0.190, t = 3.863, 
p<0.001) in Model 6 of Table 7 are positive, and thereby implying that our evidence of a positive impact 
of the CSR index on Q is significantly heightened by CG is robust to potential endogeneities that may 
arise from omitted variables.  
 Fifth, we examine the robustness of our findings to two alternative CFP measures: return on 
assets (Return on assets – an accounting based proxy) and total share returns (Total share return – a 
market based measure). Models 7 and 8 of Table 7 report results based on applying Return on assets and 
Total share return, respectively, instead of Tobin’s Q. The positive impact of the CSR index on the Return 
on assets (0.158, t = 3.620, p<0.001) and Total share return (0.125, t = 3.453, p<0.001) in models 7 and 
8 of Table 7, respectively, is observable, and thereby indicating that our results remain unchanged when 
an accounting (Return on assets) or a market (Total share return) based measure of CFP is employed 
instead of Q. Overall, the additional analyses indicate that our results are fairly robust to different types of 
endogeneities and CFP measures.  
 Finally, several studies report that CG has a positive effect on CFP (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Renders et al., 2010; Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a). Therefore, we examine the effect of the 
CG variables alone on CFP in Models 9 and 10 of Table 7. The positive effect of the CG index on the 
Tobin’s Q in Models 9 (0.128, t = 3.465, p<0.001) and 10 (0.125, = 3.453, p<0.001) of Table 7 is 
discernible, and thereby providing further support for the findings of past studies (Gompers et al., 2003; 
Bozec & Bozec, 2012; Ntim et al., 2012a). However, the relatively smaller coefficient on the CG index 
compared with when it is interacted with the CSR index (see for example Models 3 and 4 of Table 5), 
suggests that the interaction also enhances the positive effect of the CG index on Tobin’s Q. Thus, the 
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main implication is that whereas CG on its own can have a significant positive effect on CFP, CSR alone 
has a positive, but weak effect on CFP, which can be strengthened by interacting it with CG. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Although a considerable number of studies have investigated the determinants, motivations and 
consequences of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate governance (CG) practices 
separately, studies examining how and why a firm’s internal CG might influence its CSR strategies are 
rare. Therefore, this paper examines the link between corporate governance (CG) and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), and consequently, investigates whether CG can positively moderate the association 
between corporate financial performance (CFP) and CSR. The empirical findings are based on a sample 
of large South African listed corporations from 2002 to 2009. This period coincided with a period during 
which the South African authorities pursued a joint CG and CSR policy reforms that explicitly required 
corporations to engage in good CG and CSR practices for the benefit of a broader constituency of 
corporate stakeholders.  
 More specifically, we articulate an overarching neo-institutional framework to study the 
antecedents and consequences of CSR practices at the organisational level of analysis for the first time, by 
relying on insights gained from a neo-institutional model put forward by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 
1991), and Scott (2001), as well as Aguilera et al.’s (2007) multilevel theory for interpreting CSR 
practices. This framework was also informed by empirical insights obtained from the extant institutional 
theory-led studies grounded in the CSR/CG literature by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), Zattani 
and Cuomo (2008), and Judge et al. (2008, 2010). Our findings make a number of new contributions to 
the literature. First, using one of the most extensive CSR and CG data to-date, we provide new evidence 
that suggests that, on average, better-governed corporations are more predisposed to pursue a more 
socially responsible agenda than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
 Second, our results indicate that CSR practices are low in corporations with high block ownership 
and institutional ownership, but high in corporations with high government ownership, larger boards, 
diverse boards, and more independent boards. These findings are largely consistent with the predictions of 
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our generalised neo-institutional framework, which emphasises the efficiency and legitimation effects of 
CSR practices. This dualism of efficiency/legitimation characterisation is also reflected in Aguilera et 
al.’s (2007) conceptualisation of organisational level motives (i.e., instrumental, moral and relational) for 
CSR practices, albeit with the relational motive providing the ‘middle ground’, where efficiency and 
legitimation might be seen to co-exist or be reflective of the multi-faceted relationships between the firm 
and its stakeholders. In our view, therefore, an overarching institutional framework allows for an 
examination of CG and CSR by recognising not only the different economic-led incentives underpinning 
the relationship between CSR and CG, but also the social and political realities, which can then shape 
how governance arrangements operate and how social responsibility is practiced.  
 Third, and whilst the findings of a considerable number of studies that have investigated direct 
links between CFP and CSR are conflicting, there are limited attempts at explaining how and why this 
might be so. Thus, our findings distinctively contribute to the literature by providing new evidence that 
indicates that a combination of CSR and CG practices has a strong positive effect on CFP, implying that 
CG positively moderates the CSR-CFP connection. This sheds new crucial insights on and extends our 
understanding of the mixed findings of past studies that have examined direct associations between CFP 
and CSR. Our findings are generally robust across a number of econometric models that sufficiently 
address different types of endogeneities, as well as alternative CFP, CG and CSR proxies. 
 Fourth, the theoretical implication of this study is that we explicitly bring to the fore the role of 
CG-related structures, actors and policies at the organisational level of analysis of the antecedents of CSR 
practices developed by Aguilera et al. (2007). The scholars (2007: 845) refer to the pressures of insider 
groups (mainly shareholders and managers) and outsider groups (primarily consumers), as well as the role 
of top management teams in influencing firms to engage in CSR actions. However, Aguilera et al. (2007) 
do not consider more specifically the role of the board and the firm’s ownership characteristics, which to 
a large extent reflects a combination of insider and outsider groups and a blend of relational/moral 
(legitimation) and instrumental (efficiency) motives. Our study, therefore, fills this gap within the existing 
literature by showing that CG-related actors (e.g., boards and independent directors) and ownership 
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structures (e.g., ownership by institutions and governments) may well pressure the firm to engage in CSR 
practices for both legitimation (relational/moral) and efficiency (instrumental) reasons. Furthermore, our 
analysis of the relationship among CG, CSR and CFP suggests that corporations do not necessarily pursue 
legitimation and efficiency motives in isolation; instead there are significant interaction effects among 
them, which can help strengthen their relationships, including the association between CSR and CFP.  
 Finally, our findings have crucial practical implications for regulators, policy-makers, 
practitioners, companies, and governments in other countries that are currently pursuing CG and CSR 
policy reforms. With respect to governments and regulatory authorities, since our evidence suggests that 
better-governed corporations are more likely to be more socially responsible, it provides them with a 
strong motivation to pursue CG reforms formally and jointly with CSR ones. Specifically, efforts at 
enhancing boardroom practices, accounting transparency, and disclosure for shareholders should be 
pursued alongside attempts at addressing the concerns of stakeholders, such as employees, customers and 
communities regarding the environment, ethics, and health and safety, amongst others. With regard to 
corporations, since our evidence suggests that CG and CSR practices jointly impacts positively on CFP, it 
empowers corporate managers to incorporate CSR as a strategic component of the firm’s broader CG 
strategy by paying serious attention to stakeholder and sustainability concerns. Further, and as our South 
African data may or may not be relevant to other countries, future studies can adopt our overarching neo-
institutional theoretical framework within a cross-country context, which may arguably enhance 
generalisability of their findings. Similarly, it should be noted that our structural proxies may or may not 
reflect the actual behaviour of corporate boards and owners. 
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NOTES 
 
1. It is a ‘generalised and/or an ‘overarching’ neo-institutional theory because it draws from the neo-institutional framework proposed by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991), and Scott (2001), as well as Aguilera et al.’s (2007) multilevel theory for explaining CSR 
practices. It is also informed by insights from neo-institutional theory-led empirical studies by Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004), 
Zattoni and Cuomo (2008), and Judge et al. (2008, 2010) that explicitly acknowledge and incorporate both ‘efficiency’ and 
‘legitimation’ motives of economic actors operating within an institutional environment instead of directly testing for the presence of 
specific institutional isomorphism (e.g.,  coercive, mimetic, and/or normative institutional forces). 
2. One new insight that may be gained (‘takeaway’) from focusing on the South African context is that since 1994, listed companies have 
been formally required (as part of the listing rules) to report on a number of clearly defined CSR areas. By contrast, CSR reporting 
remains largely voluntary and undefined in most Anglo-American countries. For example, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) has 
resisted making CSR reporting a formal requirement for its listed firms. The LSE has argued that what constitutes CSR is not only 
vague, but also such a requirement will place ‘excessive cost burden’ on listed firms (LSE, 2007: 99). Thus, this differentiates CG 
reforms pursued in South Africa from its counterparts. In fact, the King Reports have gained international recognition and received 
several endorsements from leading academics and policy-makers as an example of a good CG model in the world. Mallin (2007: 248), 
for example, states that “South Africa has a well-developed corporate governance code. In fact, its revised Code published in 2002 is 
the most comprehensive in the world, and leading edge in terms of its outlook and recommendations”. Indeed, the relative success of 
the CG/CSR reforms in South Africa led to its main champion, a retired Supreme Court judge, Professor Mervyn King, being 
appointed as the chair of the United Nations committee on CG to lead global reforms on CG with particular focus on enhancing CG 
standards in developing countries. 
3. Although not the focus of our study, it should be noted that King II has been revised and replaced with a third King report (King III) in 
March 2010. This was mainly necessitated by general developments and changes within the international governance environment, 
including the 2007 to 2009 global financial crisis (the so-called 'credit crunch') since King II was released. King III is largely similar 
to King II. A major difference is that King III requires corporations to formally prepare an annual ‘integrated report’ consisting of 
statutory financial and sustainability (CSR) information, implying that CSR reporting is mandatory as with financial reporting. Further 
King III is in its infancy in terms of implementation, compliance and enforcement, which will require time for adequate data to be 
available regarding its impact on CG and CSR practices to be assessed. Hence, the current study focuses on King II instead of King III.  
4. BEE is a form of socio-economic affirmative action championed by the African National Congress led government to address 
historical imbalances in business participation and ownership in South Africa. Specifically, the BEE policy encourages South African 
corporations to account on an annual basis their contributions in a number of clearly defined CSR areas: corporate social investment; 
equity ownership; employment equity; enterprise development; management control; preferential procurement; and skills development. 
5. For example, the six largest pyramidal groups (namely, the Anglo American-De Beers, Rembrandt, Sanlam, Old Mutual, Liberty Life 
Insurance and Anglovaal Groups) control over 70% of the value of all shares listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, with the 
Anglo American-De Beers Group controlling 17 of the 20 largest quoted firms (Ntim et al., 2012a, b). 
6. Given the well articulated limitations of quantity measures, such as word counts (Unerman, 2000; Deegan, 2002; Branco & Rodrigues, 
2008; Hooks & Van Staden, 2011) and qualitative proxies, such as disclosure indices (Gray et al., 1995; Parker, 2005; Hackston & 
Milne, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003), we use both in order to enhance the robustness of our findings.  
7. We note that our choice is between fixed- and random-effects, but Hausman specification test conducted rejected random-effects in 
favour of fixed-effects. Intuitively, this is consistent with the use of non-random/stratified instead of random sampling procedure. We 
also follow Guest (2009) and Ntim et al. (2012a) in implementing the mean-difference technique, which is more robust in the presence 
of hetereoscedasticity (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010). However, we get essentially similar results if we run our fixed-effects 
models by employing the year dummy alternative instead of the mean-difference method. 
8. According to the theory of the firm (McGuire et al., 1988; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), CG can be considered as part of a firm‘s CSR 
strategy, implying that higher CFP may also lead to higher CSR and CG quality, and not only vice versa. Therefore, we re-estimate 
equation (2) by interchanging the positions of the CSR index and CFP (i.e., by making CSR index the main dependent variable and the 
CFP the main independent variable in addition to the control variables). We find that the coefficient on CFP is positive (0.024, t = 
0.376, p>0.100), but insignificant. Further, and to ascertain whether there is a lagged structure between CSR and CFP such that better 
performing firms are also more likely to maintain higher CSR and CG standards in the future, we introduce a one year lag between 
CSR and CFP such that the current year’s CSR (CSRt) depends on the previous year’s CFP (CFPt-1). We find that the coefficient on 
the lagged CFP (CFPt-1) is positive (0.028, t = 0.394, p>0.100), but similarly insignificant. Thus, the evidence suggests that our 
finding is not sensitive to this specification, and that the direction of causality appears to be from the CSR index to the CFP rather than 
the other way round. 
9.  To be reliable, the predicted CSR index has to be highly correlated with the actual CSR index (relevant), but lowly or uncorrelated 
with the regression residuals. The correlation between the predicted CSR index and the actual CSR index contained in Table 3 appears 
to be relatively high (i.e., 0.816 and 0.834, respectively, for the Pearson parametric and the Spearman non-parametric coefficients), 
whilst the correlation between the predicted CSR index and regression residuals seems to be comparatively low (i.e., 0.116 and 0.134, 
respectively, for the Pearson parametric and the Spearman non-parametric coefficients). By contrast, the correlation between the actual 
CSR index and regression residuals is relatively high (i.e., 0.574 and 0.610 for the Pearson parametric and the Spearman non-
parametric coefficients). Thus, the evidence appears to suggest that the predicted CSR index is largely a good and appropriate 
instrument for the actual CSR index. This is also supported by the relatively good regression diagnostics (i.e., relatively high R2 of 
0.479 and F-value of 8.895) from the first stage regression results presented in Model 5 of Table 7. To be more certain, however, we 
additionally conducted the Hausman exogeneity test, but we could not reject the null hypothesis that the predicted CSR index is 
exogenous at any reasonable statistical significance level. Overall, our analyses make us reasonable confident that the predicted CSR 
index is relevant and valid instrument for the actual CSR index.      
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APPENDIX 
CSR Practice Disclosure Index
CSR Theme CSR Item: Information On or Reference To Range of 
Scores 
Total Score 
Per Theme 
(i). Ethics 1.        Fair business practices (excluding equal opportunity theme for   
           employees covered under BEE). 
0-4  
 
 
16 
2.        Policies and practices in relation to fraud and corruption. 0-4 
3.        Code of ethics (adoption, implementation and/or enforcement). 0-4 
4.        Policies and practices relating to the treatment of labour, union and 
           human rights. 
0-4 
(ii). Health and 
safety, except 
HIV/Aids initiatives 
5.        Legal requirements and health & safety policies. 0-2  
 
14 
6.        Product and customer safety. 0-4 
7.        Safety in the workplace, excluding HIV/Aids related disclosures.   0-4 
8.        Health programmes for employees, excluding HIV/Aids related   
           disclosures. 
0-4 
(iii). HIV/Aids , 
including projects in 
the community 
9.        Good governance. 0-2  
 
13 
10.      Measurement, monitoring and evaluation. 0-4 
11.      Workplace conditions and management. 0-3 
12.      Depth, quality and sustainability of programmes. 0-4 
(iv). Environment 13.      Overall company policy recognising environmental issues,    
           standards and achievements (including awards).   
0-4  
 
 
14 
14.      Detailed management policy or strategy in place to address 
           environmental issues. 
0-2 
15.      Detailed environmental themes (e.g., materials, water, and  
           energy), related actions and impacts.  
0-4 
16.      Other activities relating to conservation, aesthetics, and  
           sustainability, amongst others.  
0-4 
(v). Black economic 
empowerment 
(BEE), except social 
investment 
17.      Equity ownership. 0-4  
 
 
24 
18.      Management control. 0-4 
19.      Employment equity.  0-4 
20.      Skills development. 0-4 
21.      Preferential procurement. 0-4 
22.      Enterprise development. 0-4 
(vi).  Social, 
including BEE 
social investment 
23.      Education. 0-4  
 
16 
24.      Health, excluding HIV/Aids initiatives. 0-4 
25.      Arts and heritage.  0-4 
26.      Other community support and poverty alleviation projects.  0-4 
Total  26 CSR Items  97 
Scoring Procedure 
0:           No disclosure. 
1:           General or rhetorical (including instances of ritualistic and repeated) statements: deemed to be purely symbolic with no  
              evidence of actual actions/activities on the ground. 
2:           Narrative explanation of what has actually been done or implemented: deemed to be a message of commitment (beyond    
              symbolic). 
3:           Information provided in (2) above supported by quantitative/monetary data: deemed to be substantive by providing   
              evidence of the scale of activities or actions. 
4:           Information provided in (3) above supported by explicit assessments of performance (relative to last period) or events  
              (even if they are ’bad’ news), and which allows comparison between companies using external reporting models/ 
              benchmarks/assurance: deemed to be comprehensive. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Measures and Variables 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Variables – Quantity Measures (Word Counts) 
Total CSR count is the total CSR proxy covering six broad areas, incorporating both SA context-specific: black economic  
  empowerment; and HIV/Aids, and traditional: environment; ethics; health and safety; and social investment  
  CSR disclosures. It measures the extent (in terms of word count) and nature (in terms of the six specified  
  headings) of CSR disclosures in both corporate annual and sustainability reports, which is normalised by  
  taking a natural log. The Appendix contains the detailed items and the scoring procedure. 
BEE count  is the total word count of black economic empowerment (BEE) disclosures covering six broad areas 
  demonstrating corporate commitment to affirmative action and CSR, including:  equity ownership; 
  employment equity; enterprise development; management control; preferential procurement; and skills 
  development, which is normalised by taking a natural log. The Appendix contains the detailed items and the  
  scoring procedure. 
OTHERS  Is the total word count of CSR disclosures relating to the environment, ethics, HIV/Aids, health and safety,  
  and social investment, which are normalised by taking natural logs. The Appendix contains the detailed 26  
  items and the scoring procedure. 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Variables – Qualitative Measures (Disclosure Indices) 
CSR index score A CSR practice disclosure index containing 26 items based six main themes, including: six BEE items, four  
  items each on the environment, ethics, HIV/Aids, health and safety, and social investment. All 26 items  
  (except four, of which three are scored from 0 to 2 and a fourth one is scored 0 to 3) have a score ranging  
  from 0 to 4, resulting in a total potential score of 97; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. The Appendix  
  contains the detailed 26 items and the scoring procedure. 
Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) Variables 
Tobin’s Q Ratio of total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity to total assets.  
Return on assets  Percentage of operating profit to total assets. 
Total share return Percentage of total share returns made up of share price and dividends. 
Corporate Governance (CG)/Alternative CG Variables 
CG index CG index containing 41 provisions from King II that takes a value of 1 if each of the 41 CG provisions is 
disclosed in the annual report, 0 otherwise; scaled to a value between 0% and 100%. These CG provisions are 
presented in Sections 1 to 4 of the Appendix in Ntim et al. (2012a: 102). 
Board diversity Percentage of male and female non-white directors (blacks, Asians and mixed race) to the total number of 
directors on the board of a company. 
Board size Natural log of the total number of directors on the board of a company. 
Block ownership Percentage of ordinary shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the total company ordinary   
  shareholdings. 
Govt. ownership Percentage of government ownership to total company ordinary shareholdings. 
Indep. directors Percentage of independent non-executive directors to the total number of directors on the board of a firm. 
Inst. ownership  Percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional shareholders. 
Interaction and Instrumented Variables 
Inter. variables  Interaction variable between CG index and total CSR count/index. We also create similar interaction terms  
  for the six alternative (board diversity, block ownership, board size, government ownership, independent  
  non-executive directors, and institutional  ownership) CG variables as part of our sensitivity analysis. 
Pred. CSR index Predicted variable used as an instrumental variable for the CSR index as part of our sensitivity analysis. 
Reg. residuals Predicted regression errors, used in testing the validity of the instrument as part of our sensitivity analysis  
Control Variables 
Advertising exp. Percentage of total advertising expenditure/expense to total assets. 
Audit firm size 1, if a firm is audited by a big four audit firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young,  
  and KPMG), 0 otherwise. 
Capital expenditure  Percentage of total capital expenditure/expense to total assets. 
CG committee 1, if a company has set up a corporate governance committee, 0 otherwise 
Cross-listing 1, if a company is listed on a foreign stock market, 0 otherwise.  
CSR committee 1, if a company has set up a corporate social responsibility committee, 0 otherwise. 
Leverage  Percentage of total debt to total assets.  
Firm size  Natural log of total assets. 
Risk  Standard deviation of the CFP measure (i.e., Tobin’Q/return on assets/total share return). 
R&D expenditure Percentage of research and development expenditure/expense to total assets. 
Sales growth Percentage of current year’s sales minus previous year’s sales to previous year’s sales. 
Industry  Dummies for each of the five main industries: basic material + oil gas; consumer goods, consumer services +  
  health care; industrials; and technology + telecoms firms. 
Year  Dummies for each of the eight years from 2002 to 2009 inclusive. 
 48 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary Descriptive Statistics of all Variables for all 600 Firm Years 
         High CSR index – Low CSR index    
                                                                                                                                  ----------------------------------------- 
Variable                      Mean        Median       STD            Maxi         Mini     VIF     Mean Diff.        Median Diff. 
Panel A: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Variables – Quantity Measures (Word Counts) 
Total CSR count       4,080.85    2,734.00    4,019.19     23,371.00   186.00      -              -                        - 
BEE count                1,334.43       918.00    1,332.78       8,347.00      50.00      -                -                        - 
Env. count                   936.94       403.50    1,336.88     8,225.00        9.00      -              -                        - 
Ethics count                222.41       150.00       209.80     1,722.00      10.00      -                -                        - 
HIV count                   358.17       200.00       593.06     8,211.00      10.00      -              -                        - 
Hea. & saf.                  524.43       200.00       838.15     5,827.00      10.00      -                -                        - 
Social invest.              704.46       426.50        731.03     4,482.00      11.00      -               -                         - 
Panel B: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Variables – Quality Measures (Disclosure Indices) 
CSR index (%)          56.42        54.64  16.19           77.32         6.19        -               -                       - 
BEE index (%)             63.25        58.33          17.38           83.33        4.17         -              -                        -  
Env. index (%)             59.68        57.14          16.71           78.57        7.14         -              -                        - 
Ethics index (%)          44.69         43.75         15.88           75.00        6.25         -              -                        - 
HIV index (%)             53.65         53.84         14.97           76.92        7.69         -              -                        - 
Hea. & Saf. (%)           55.13         50.00         15.60           71.43        7.14         -              -                        - 
Social invest. (%)        57.86         56.25         19.78           87.50        6.25         -              -                        - 
Panel C: Corporate Governance (CG)/Alternative CG Variables 
CG index (%)         71.33        73.17         16.30     100.00         4.88      2.30         8.75***               9.34*** 
Board diversity (%)     30.48        25.00         17.35       85.71         6.67      3.25         6.48***               5.20*** 
Board size         11.35        11.00           3.46       21.00         4.00      1.68         1.85†                  1.93†  
Block ownership (%)   53.14        52.06         21.50       97.86         5.94      3.79       -4.76***              -3.80** 
Govt. ownership (%)     7.94          6.59            9.65       71.94         0.00      3.85        2.39**                 2.46**       
Indep. directors (%)    45.28         43.81         17.85           92.31         5.88      2.97        2.30*                  1.98† 
Inst. ownership (%)     77.96        89.70         24.12       98.69         5.94      3.76       -4.96***               -3.74** 
Panel D: Corporate Financial Performance (CFP)/Alternative CFP Variables 
Tobin’s Q           1.75         1.56           0.79        6.56          0.70        -               -                           - 
Return on assets (%)   13.82        12.82         11.49      71.12       -19.96       -               -                           - 
Total share return (%) 37.18        32.66        47.77    268.57       -75.58       -               -                           - 
Panel E: Control Variables 
Advertising exp. (%)   1.05           0.96         2.80              19.42         0.00      2.40         1.88†                             1.90† 
Audit firm size (%)   85.50       100.00        35.24    100.00          0.00      3.52         6.50***               5.85*** 
Capital exp. (%)          7.20           5.90          5.59             60.86          0.00      2.60        -0.96                 -0.84 
CG committee (%)    50.00         50.00        50.00           100.00          0.00      3.75         5.32***               6.37*** 
Cross-listing (%)       38.33           0.00        48.66    100.00          0.00      3.88         7.85***                         8.14*** 
CSR committee (%)  36.67           0.00        53.79    100.00          0.00      2.73         8.39***               7.83*** 
Leverage (%)      48.99          50.17        18.83              93.61         1.14     2.40        -1.08                  -0.90                   
Firm size        3.74           3.79          0.85                5.93         0.70     1.06          2.59*                  2.63* 
Risk (%)      33.98         19.87         44.87           400.10          1.78     3.82          0.47                   0.38 
R&D exp. (%)            3.56           3.24           3.93             36.48         0.00     2.65         -1.65                  -1.52 
Sales growth (%)        3.28           9.42         27.82      93.51      -99.96    3.97          0.38                    0.33 
Notes: The table reports summary descriptive statistics, variance inflation factor (VIF) values, and mean/median differences for sub-samples of 
firms with high and low corporate social responsibility (CSR) scores, respectively. ***, **,  *, and † denote mean/median difference between 
firms with high CSR index score (i.e., firms with CSR index score above  the overall mean/median mark) and firms with low CSR index score 
(i.e., firms with CSR index score below the overall mean/median marks, respectively) is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Table 1 fully defines all the variables used.  
 49 
 
 
Table 3 
Pearson’s and Spearman’s Correlation Matrices of the Variables for all 600 Firm Years 
Variable                                   1.               2.           3.           4.          5.          6.             7.           8.           9.         10.        11.        12.         13.            14.          15.          16.        17.            18. 
1.   CSR index                                          .441***   .123**  -.186***  .120**    .193***     .196***   -.114**    .079†      .315***  -.040     .390***   .478***      .416***    -.035       .238***    .834***      .610***   
 
2.   CG index               .480***                   .122**   -.187***  .141***  .145***     .093*     -.034      .259***  .323***   -.033     .589***    .190***     .210***    -.040      .166***   .453***       .094*                   
 
3.   Board diversity                 .118**      .109*                      -.049     .425***   .124**      .133**     .049     -.104**   .103**     .079†     .008       -.045       -.046      .014       .363***   .116**        .123** 
  
4.   Block ownership             -.130**    -.156***   -.031
 
                 -.021      -.257***   -.163***   .238***   -.049      .034     .109**    .010       -.061       -.071†       .088*     -.042     -.125**       -.095* 
        
5.   Board size                      .122**     .131**     .344***  -.002                     .315***     .033       .139**    -.067†     .048     .125**   -.094*      .098*        .001       -.152***   .644***   .132**         .038 
                 
6.   Government ownership   .165***     .185***    .071†    -.200***   .204***                  .239***   .264***    .009       .005    .074†     .106**    .186***      .199***   -.300***   .521***   .206***       .060 
 
7.   Indep. directors               .187***     .187***   .130**  -.145***   .004      .109**        .056        .048     -.066    -.023       .098*       .099*        .027      -.203***   .214***   .187***        .076† 
 
8.   Inst. ownership              -.162***   -.044       .009      .367***   .129**    .198***    .061                      -.190***  -.055    .128**   -.021       -.042        -.061       .011      .193***  -.120**       -.053 
 
9.   Tobin’s Q                       .080†       .224***   -.074†    -.101**   -.068†     .010       .073†
 
      .282***                   .051    -.075†    .220***    .138**      .221***    -.016      .026       .088*         .025        
 
10. Audit firm size             .336***     .353***   .106**    .047      .070†      .046       -.062       -.008      .093*                    .070†     .251***     .227***    .054       -.079†      .008       .362***        .148***   
 
11. Capital expenditure     -.010       -.040       .095*     .099*     .103*     .098*      -.043       .111**   -.058        .090*                   .036        -.008       .025       -.124**    .299***   -.043            .037 
 
12. CG commitee               .384***     .557***   .018      .015      -.059     .069†       .098*     -.027      .197***     .251***   .047                      .267***   .161***   -.195***    .041       .424***        .115**   
 
13. Cross-listing                 .469***   .214***  -.053     -.048      .079†     .157***     .100*      .008       .114**      .227***   .009       .267***         .315***   -.042       .201***    .482***       .052 
 
14. CSR committee            .391***   .216***  -.067†    -.063      .008      .131**      .036      -.085*     .216***    .052       .071†     .161***     .310***                     .002      .187***   .421***        .041 
 
15. Leverage                     -.038     -.033      .021       .077†    -.090*    -.131**    -.212***  -.011      -.009      -.063      -.145***  -.206***    .027          .015                    -.236***  -.044          -.028 
 
16. Firm size                      .212***   .171***  .248**   -.069†     .602***   .407***    .230***   .164***    .008       .022      -.265***   .070†       .184***      .254***   -.219***                 .239***      .170***   
 
17. Predicted CSR index   .816***   .448**   .113**   -.120**   .126**    .194***    .169***   -.116**    .104**     .358***   -.049       .435***    .468***     .410***   -.037      -.235***                    .134***               
 
18. Regression residuals   .574***   .087*    .120**   -.089*    .034        .058        .070†     -.044        .020      .133**      .030        .112***   .043         .036       -.023       .168***    .116** 
Notes: The bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table shows Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients.  ***, **,  *, and † 
denote correlation is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-tailed tests). Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 4 
Effects of Corporate Governance on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures Based on Disclosure Indices 
Dependent Variables 
                            ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. Variables  CSR index  CSR ind.    CSR ind.   BEE ind.    Env. ind.   Ethics ind.   HIV ind.    H&S ind.   Social ind. 
(Model)                   (1)               (2)             (3)              (4)               (5)               (6)             (7)              (8)                (9) 
Governance Index: 
   CG index           0.203***          -               0.180***      0.173***      0.154***        0.148*** 0.139***      0.065           0.120* 
              (0.000)          -           (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)    (0.240)       (0.019) 
Ownership Variables:     
   Block ownership -               -0.170***      -0.162***     -0.151***     -0.146***      -0.064       -0.158***      -0.073       -0.142*** 
                               -               (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.357)      (0.000)        (0.235)      (0.000) 
   Govt. ownership -                0.183***       0.175***       0.150***      0.160***       0.064         0.166***      0.138***      0.145***   
                               -               (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.203)      (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Inst. ownership   -               -0.115†        -0.110†        -0.174***      -0.120*        -0.059        -0.125*       -0.136**     -0.169*** 
                               -               (0.057)        (0.064)        (0.000)       (0.028)        (0.210)      (0.033)       (0.007)       (0.000) 
Board  Variables:  
   Board diversity   -      0.156***       0.140***       0.151***      0.064           0.159***  0.162***      0.148***     0.150*** 
                 -     (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.219)        (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000)      (0.000) 
   Board size          -                 0.108†        0.103†          0.137***      0.158***        0.045          0.132***      0.161***     0.129** 
                              -                (0.059)       (0.065)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.360)       (0.006)       (0.000)     (0.006) 
   Indep. directors  -                 0.126*         0.098†         0.094†         0.129*          0.110†         0.122*        0.105†        0.120* 
                              -                (0.040)       (0.069)        (0.072)        (0.038)         (0.054)       (0.045)      (0.060)      (0.049) 
Control Variables:  
    Audit fir. size 0.260***         0.302***       0.198***       0.137***       0.118*         0.215***      0.196***        0.298***    0.269*** 
            (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.040)        (0.000)       (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.000) 
   Cap. exp.       -0.042          -0.050          -0.029        -0.036          -0.040         -0.033         -0.025         -0.050        -0.039 
                          (0.308)        (0.285)         (0.458)       (0.447)        (0.281)        (0.492)        (0.640)        (0.174)      (0.427) 
   CG comtte.     0.171***        0.310***        0.196***       0.219***       0.460***       0.116*         0.265***       0.320***      0.149* 
            (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)         (0.048)       (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.036) 
   Cross-listing   0.432***        0.426***        0.430***      0.568***       0.240***        0.190*** 0.347***       0.158*         0.489*** 
            (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)     (0.041)       (0.000) 
   CSR comtte.   0.285***        0.349***      0.310***       0.573***       0.218***       0.286***      0.219***       0.480***      0.394*** 
                         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.002)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Leverage        -0.030          -0.041         -0.032         -0.056          -0.063         -0.018         -0.047         -0.069       -0.070 
                         (0.659)         (0.387)        (0.475)        (0.181)        (0.139)       (0.795)        (0.296)        (0.192)      (0.164) 
   Firm size        0.210***        0.243***       0.239***       0.150*         0.237***       0.244***       0.218***       0.275***      0.263*** 
                         (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.026)        (0.000)       (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Risk                0.038           0.050           0.042          0.029           0.065          0.027           0.020          0.067           0.046 
                         (0.470)        (0.354)         (0.376)       (0.503)        (0.178)       (0.529)         (0.692)       (0.174)        (0.380) 
   Sales growth  0.018           0.037           0.025          0.023           0.031          0.050           0.049           0.057          0.045 
                         (0.740)        (0.459)        (0.510)       (0.520)        (0.462)        (0.241)         (0.363)        (0.219)       (0.296) 
   Industry       Included      Included      Included    Included      Included       Included     Included      Included     Included 
   Year            Included      Included      Included    Included      Included       Included     Included      Included     Included 
Constant            2.975***      3.984***        3.913***      2.750***       2.368***        2.637***      2.526***         2.402***        2.619*** 
                         (0.000)       (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000) 
Durbin-W.        2.072          2.191            2.206         2.183           1. 895          1.827           1.960            2.054           1.998 
F-value             8.316***      9.780***        9.998***      9.640***        6.670***       5.509***       7.473***         8.140***        7.871*** 
Adj. R2             0.475          0.490            0.496         0.482            0.357           0.249           0.378            0.433           0.384 
N                         600            600                600            600               600              600              600               600             600 
 Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust double clustered standard errors 
technique along both industry and year dimensions.  ***, **,  *, and † denote correlation is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 5 
Regression Analyses of the Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures on Corporate Financial Performance 
Dependent Variables 
                            ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. Variables     Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q   Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q   Tobin’s Q     Tobin’s Q 
(Model)                      (1)              (2)             (3)              (4)               (5)             (6)              (7)                (8)                (9) 
CSR Variables: 
   CSR index            0.033            -               0.136***          -            0.138***         -             0.140***             -                 0.134*** 
                 (0.180)            -            (0.000)            -           (0.000)            -           (0.000)          -              (0.000) 
   CSR count                -             0.028              -             0.122*           -              0.133***         -                 0.137***          -                
                       -            (0.195)            -            (0.013)           -            (0.000)            -                (0.000)           -           
 Interaction Variables: 
Governance Index: 
   CSR*CG indices     -          -              0.190***      0.184***          -                 -              0.195***         0.191***       0.186*** 
                      -          -          (0.000)       (0.000)           -                -              (0.000)      (0.000)       (0.000) 
Ownership Variables: 
   CSR*Block own.    -               -                  -                  -           -0.036        -0.020          -0.038            -0.029         -0.032 
                                   -               -                  -                  -           (0.374)       (0.463)        (0.367)           (0.408)        (0.380) 
   CSR*Govt. own.     -               -                  -                   -            0.186***      0.172***      0.188***           0.176***      0.179***   
                                   -               -                  -                  -           (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)           (0.000)        (0.000) 
   CSR*Inst. own.       -               -                  -                  -           -0.035         -0.030         -0.040            -0.034         -0.037 
                                   -               -                  -                  -           (0.363)       (0.454)        (0.352)           (0.436)        (0.351) 
Board  Variables:  
   CSR*Board div.     -         -                  -                  -            0.182***        0.178***       0.185***         0.182***            - 
                     -         -                  -                 -            (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000)      (0.000)              - 
   CSR*Board size     -                -                  -                 -            0.045            0.036          0.050             0.045               - 
                                   -               -                  -                 -            (0.252)        (0.335)        (0.239)          (0.314)              - 
   CSR*Ind. dtors.      -               -                  -                 -             0.121***       0.113*        0.125***          0.120***             - 
                                   -               -                  -                 -            (0.000)       (0.014)         (0.000)           (0.000)             - 
Control Variables:  
    Audit fir. size 0.182***        0.176***       0.173***       0.160***      0.175***        0.164***     0.180***        0.171***      0.168*** 
            (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)      (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Cap. exp.       -0.036          -0.030         -0.044        -0.040         -0.045          -0.042         -0.050          -0.044        -0.042 
                         (0.200)         (0.258)        (0.195)       (0.223)        (0.192)        (0.220)        (0.186)         (0.213)       (0.198) 
   CG comtte.     0.040           0.037           0.046           0.040          0.050           0.043          0.054            0.047         0.050 
            (0.234)        (0.253)        (0.225)        (0.242)       (0.210)        (0.220)        (0.198)      (0.216)       (0.203) 
   Cross-listing   0.150***       0.144***        0.156***      0.149***       0.163***       0.155***       0.167***        0.160***      0.162*** 
            (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)      (0.295)       (0.000) 
   Leverage       -0.035          -0.030         -0.038         -0.032         -0.041         -0.036         -0.049           -0.040         -0.043 
                         (0.324)         (0.336)        (0.316)       (0.330)        (0.310)        (0.325)        (0.298)         (0.319)       (0.305) 
   Firm size       -0.165***       -0.160***     -0.171***     -0.166***      -0.175***      -0.169***     -0.178***       -0.173***     -0.170*** 
                         (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Risk                0.154***        0.146***      0.160***       0.152***       0.164***        0.156***      0.168***         0.160***      0.163*** 
                         (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Sales growth  0.220***        0.214***      0.226***        0.218***      0.229***        0.224***       0.233***        0.220***      0.216*** 
                         (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Industry       Included      Included      Included    Included      Included       Included     Included      Included      Included 
   Year            Included      Included      Included    Included      Included       Included     Included      Included      Included 
Governance Index, Ownership and Board Variables: 
CG Variables    -                      -                CGI             CGI      Board/Own.   Board/Own.  Included       Included   CGI/Own. 
Constant            0.785***      0.780***        0.794***      0.786**        0.803***        0.790***       0.814***        0.802***        0.789*** 
                         (0.000)       (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.002)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000) 
Durbin-W.        2.084          2.036            2.110         2.105           2.185           2.193            2.246            2.216          2.205 
F-value             8.546***      8.496***        8.787***      8.669***        9.510***       9.498***        9.986***         9.884***       9.730*** 
Adj. R2             0.467          0.463            0.475         0.470            0.490           0.486           0.543             0.539          5.280 
N                         600             600               600            600               600              600              600                600             600 
 Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust double clustered standard errors 
technique along both industry and year dimensions.  ***, **,  *, and † denote correlation is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 6 
Effects of Corporate Governance on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures Based on Word Counts 
Dependent Variables 
                            ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. Variables  CSR count   CSR cou.   CSR cou.   BEE cou.   Env. cou.   Ethics cou.   HIV cou.   H&S cou.   Social cou. 
(Model)                   (1)               (2)             (3)              (4)               (5)               (6)             (7)              (8)                (9) 
Governance Index: 
   CG index           0.196***          -               0.172***      0.146***      0.142***        0.062 0.125***      0.119*         0.116* 
              (0.000)          -           (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.225)       (0.000)    (0.020)       (0.024) 
Ownership Variables:     
   Block ownership -               -0.164***      -0.153***     -0.118†       -0.143***      -0.037       -0.024         -0.135***     -0.121* 
                               -               (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.054)       (0.000)        (0.401)      (0.593)        (0.000)      (0.048) 
   Govt. ownership -                0.176***       0.164***       0.149***      0.085*          0.076†        0.152***      0.089*       0.136***   
                               -               (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.024)        (0.091)      (0.000)       (0.025)       (0.000) 
   Inst. ownership   -               -0.133*        -0.122**       -0.118*       -0.173***      -0.116*      -0.164***    -0.147***     -0.110* 
                               -               (0.023)        (0.034)        (0.046)       (0.000)        (0.048)      (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.049) 
Board  Variables:  
   Board diversity   -      0.149***       0.133***       0.137***      0.155***        0.198***  0.120*        0.106*       0.076† 
                 -     (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000) (0.024)     (0.030)      (0.073) 
   Board size          -                 0.091*         0.090*         0.113**        0.102*          0.096*         0.078†       0.111**       0.160*** 
                              -                (0.015)       (0.017)        (0.006)        (0.019)         (0.012)      (0.088)       (0.010)      (0.000) 
   Indep. directors  -                 0.053†        0.050†          0.047†          0.141***        0.056†        0.125**       0.060†        0.065† 
                              -                (0.085)       (0.094)        (0.098)        (0.000)         (0.090)       (0.001)      (0.073)      (0.059) 
Control Variables:  
    Audit fir. size 0.253**          0.290***       0.180*         0.115*         0.073†          0.202***      0.143*         0.338***      0.224*** 
            (0.002)         (0.000)        (0.019)        (0.046)        (0.058)        (0.000)       (0.020)      (0.000)      (0.000) 
   Cap. exp.       -0.034          -0.032          -0.022        -0.024          -0.038         -0.028         -0.017         -0.047        -0.031 
                          (0.293)        (0.274)         (0.449)       (0.436)        (0.270)        (0.480)        (0.637)        (0.189)      (0.416) 
   CG comttee.   0.166**         0.293***       0.184**         0.204***       0.451***       0.084†         0.254***       0.311***      0.138* 
            (0.009)         (0.000)        (0.003)        (0.000)       (0.000)         (0.077)       (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.040) 
   Cross-listing   0.456***        0.453***        0.446***      0.581***       0.262***       0.164* 0.323***       0.067†         0.478*** 
            (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.018)        (0.000)     (0.072)       (0.000) 
   CSR comtte.   0.272***        0.338***      0.307***       0.200**         0.560***       0.274***      0.224***       0.478***      0.385*** 
                         (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.003)        (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Leverage       -0.011          -0.025         -0.020         -0.040          -0.054         -0.006         -0.036         -0.045        -0.052 
                         (0.725)         (0.410)        (0.499)        (0.190)        (0.173)       (0.891)        (0.324)        (0.211)      (0.181) 
   Firm size        0.201***        0.237***       0.234***       0.132*         0.223***       0.231***       0.206***       0.262***      0.252*** 
                         (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.043)        (0.000)       (0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000) 
   Risk                0.025           0.029           0.027          0.020           0.052          0.021           0.014          0.058           0.033 
                         (0.453)        (0.384)         (0.399)       (0.560)        (0.289)       (0.600)         (0.713)       (0.249)        (0.371) 
   Sales growth   0.009           0.023           0.020          0.018           0.024          0.046           0.031           0.040          0.038 
                         (0.769)        (0.483)        (0.525)       (0.542)        (0.477)        (0.257)         (0.392)        (0.243)       (0.322) 
   Industry       Included      Included      Included    Included      Included       Included     Included      Included     Included 
   Year            Included      Included      Included    Included      Included       Included     Included      Included     Included 
Constant            1.890***      1.973***        1.907***      1.686***       1.464***        1.545***      1.431***         1.380***        1.507*** 
                         (0.000)       (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000) 
Durbin-W.        2.065          2.176            2.195         2.163           1. 904          1.792           1.895            1.997           1.972 
F-value             8.259***      9.698***        9.924***      9.539***        6.541***       5.360***       6.986***         8.070***        7.683*** 
Adj. R2             0.466          0.482            0.485         0.473            0.342           0.223           0.361            0.429           0.376 
N                         600            600                600            600               600              600              600               600             600 
 Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust double clustered standard errors 
technique along both industry and year dimensions.  ***, **,  *, and † denote correlation is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
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Table 7 
Sensitivity Analyses of the Relationships among Corporate Financial Performance, Governance and Social Responsibility 
Dependent Variables 
                            ____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Indep. Variables          CSR index        Q            Q       Lagged(Q)   Stage 1(CSR)  Stage 2(Q)   ROA       TSR                Q              Q   
(Model)                            (1)               (2)           (3)            (4)                (5)                 (6)             (7)           (8)                 (9)            (10) 
CSR Variables: 
   CSR index                      -             0.138***      0.135***     0.130***         -                  -                0.158***      0.125***        -              -                 
                           -        (0.000)        (0.000)      (0.000)            -                  -              (0.000)        (0.000)          -              - 
   Pred. CSR index            -                -                 -                 -                   -             0.175***            -                  -                -              - 
                                          -                -                 -                -                    -             (0.000)             -                  -                -              - 
Governance Index 
   CG index                   0.178***      0.185***        0.180***     0.176***      0.182***     0.190***           0.189***    0.130***       0.128***    0.125*** 
                                    (0.000)        (0.000)       (0.000)      (0.000)       (0.000)      (0.000)         (0.000)     (0.000)         (0.000)      (0.000) 
Ownership Variables: 
   Block ownership       -0.169***    -0.030        -0.026        -0.034         -0.168***        -             -0.060           -0.024          -            -0.016 
                                     (0.000)      (0.390)       (0.397)       (0.382)        (0.000)          -             (0.125)         (0.385)         -            (0.539) 
   Block ownership2     -0.023        -0.013             -                 -                  -                -                  -                    -              -                - 
                                    (0.465)      (0.596)            -                 -                  -                 -                  -                    -             -                 - 
   Govt. ownership       0.171***     0.173***      0.182***     0.178***      0.182***          -            0.127***         0.116**        -              0.095† 
                                   (0.000)      (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)            -           (0.000)          (0.008)          -            (0.064) 
   Inst. ownership       -0.119*      -0.035        -0.032        -0.030          -0.114*            -           -0.046            -0.025           -             -0.030 
                                  (0.050)       (0.378)       (0.383)       (0.389)        (0.020)            -           (0.229)          (0.390)           -            (0.385) 
   Iinst. ownership2    -0.034        -0.029             -                 -                   -                  -                -                   -                  -              - 
                                  (0.376)       (0.394)            -                -                    -                 -                -                    -                 -               - 
Board Variables: 
   Board diversity       0.143***      0.170***      0.165***      0.162***       0.195***         -           0.173***        0.140***          -             0.132*** 
                                 (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)           -          (0.000)         (0.000)             -            (0.000) 
   Board size              0.110*        0.043          0.040           0.036           0.108†            -           0.050            0.023               -            0.029 
                                 (0.048)      (0.247)        (0.253)        (0.264)        (0.056)            -          (0.216)          (0.410)             -           (0.423) 
   Board size2            0.032          0.036             -                  -                   -                 -                 -                   -                   -               - 
                                (0.474)       (0.260)            -                  -                   -                 -                 -                   -                  -                - 
   Indep. directors     0.109†         0.115*        0.110†            0.103†         0.103†           -          0.159***        0.145***                -             0.116* 
                               (0.054)        (0.049)       (0.054)        (0.061)       (0.060)           -         (0.000)         (0.000)                   -          (0.044) 
Additional Control Variables: 
   Advertising exp.       -                 -             0.165***          -               -0.040            -               0.128***              0.163***           -                - 
                                    -                 -            (0.000)            -               (0.396)           -              (0.000)          (0.000)             -                - 
   R&D exp.                 -                 -            -0.048             -                0.190***        -               -0.146***       -0.040              -                - 
                                    -                 -            (0.249)            -               (0.000)           -               (0.000)          (0.256)            -                - 
Interactions                 -         Included      Included    Included             -          CSR*CGI   Included        Included              -                - 
Controls              Included    Included      Included     Included      Included     Included     Included       Included       Included     Included 
Constant                3.643***     0.820***      0.835***     0.746***       3.753***     0.745***       4.620***        -0.095            0.489***       0.495*** 
                            (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.000)      (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.947)          (0.000)         (0.000) 
Durbin-W.           2.135          2.254          2.267          2.183          2.148         2.029            2.269            2.010            1.853            1.936 
F-value                9.584***      9.975***      9.997***      9.624***      8.895***     8.786***        9.968***        8.687***        4.950***           5.359*** 
Adj. R2                0.469          0.539          0.546          0.520          0.479         0.475            0.553            0.460             0.296           0.378 
N                            600            600              600             525             600            600               600               600                600              600 
 Notes: P-values are in parentheses. Following Peterson (2009), the coefficients are estimated by using the robust double clustered standard errors 
technique along both industry and year dimensions.  ***, **,  *, and † denote correlation is significant at the .1%, 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 1 fully defines all the variables used. 
